4 ideas
18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. | |
From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions. |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All experience is the experience of meaning (Sinn). Everything that appears to consciousness, everything that is for consciousness in general, is meaning. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Semiology and Grammatology [1968], p.26) | |
A reaction: This an assertion, from a quite different philosophical tradition, of the centrality of linguistic meaning in philosophy. It links with the centrality of intentionality in our understanding of the mind. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |
Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are. | |
From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world. |