48 ideas
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Someone first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts and asks your agreement that all the parts are identical with that unity, then ridicules you that you have to admit one is many, and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only only one thing. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) | |
A reaction: This is a passing aporia, but actually seems to approach the central mystery of the metaphysics of identity. A thing can't be a 'unity' if there are not things to unify? So what sorts of 'unification' are there? |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
Full Idea: It will be ridiculous if our student knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself, but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, used in housebuilding. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 62a) | |
A reaction: This is the equivalent of being able to recite numbers, but not to count objects. It also resembles Molyneux's question (to Locke), of whether recognition by one sense entails recognition by others. Nice (and a bit anti-platonist!). |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The arithmetic of the many computes sums of unequal units, such as two armies, or two herds, ..but philosopher's arithmetic computes when it is guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 56d) | |
A reaction: But of course 'the many' are ironing out the differences too, when they say there are 'three armies'. Shocking snob, Plato. Even philosophers are interested in the difference between three armies and three platoons. |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
Full Idea: Any kind of mixture that does not ...possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases but really an unconnected medley, and ruin what contains it. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64d) | |
A reaction: My guess is that Plato is thinking of the decay of living things when they die, losing the proportions of psuché, and then applying this to the unity of inanimate objects as well. One might compare Leibniz's monads. |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
Full Idea: Any blend [mixture] which does not have measure or the nature of proportion in any way whatsoever, of necessity destroys both its ingredients and, primarily, itself. It is truly no blend at all, but a kind of unblended disaster. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) | |
A reaction: Obviously there can be chaotic mixtures, but I guess Plato is picking out mixtures about which we can say something |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all? | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a) | |
A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted? |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d) | |
A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though. |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Could we attribute certainty to studying aspects of the world, such as how it arose, or acts, or is acted upon, when none of them ever was or will be constant? Of course not. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 59b) |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: Moderation and proportion seem, in effect, to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we're looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
Full Idea: Both intellect and pleasure are completely absolved of being the good itself, since they both lack independence, that is, sufficiency and perfection. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Plato disagreeing with Socrates, who sees reason and intellect as central to morality. Presumable he means that the good should be a primitive. Why is pleasure not sufficient? |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
Full Idea: If we are unable to net the good in a single concept, three must capture it: namely, beauty, proportion and truth. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 65a) | |
A reaction: Very interesting. More illuminating than the discussion of the Good in 'Republic'. Is a handsome and honest murderer good? Is beauty part of the nature of the good, or a hallmark of it? |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
Full Idea: Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure. | |
From: report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly? |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
Full Idea: Living beings experience pleasures and pains which seem, and indeed are, false. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 42c) | |
A reaction: The idea that there are 'authentic' pleasures and pains needs some investigation. Misguided anger is a false pain? Vanity is a false pleasure? |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b) | |
A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense? |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
Full Idea: Neither pleasure nor intellect comprises the good. If it did it would have to be sufficient and perfect. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 22b) | |
A reaction: Seems sensible. I can't make sense of any vision of the good which consists of suppressing some aspect of human nature. (Hm. Our capacity for violence?) |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Try thinking about the life of pleasure without reason, and the life of reason without pleasure. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 20e) | |
A reaction: I suspect that we see the two as more deeply entangled that Plato did. It would be hard to motivate reasoning if we didn't enjoy it. Pleasure without reason sound dire. |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
Full Idea: My contention is that reason, intellect, memory - along with correct belief and true calculation - are far better than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 11b) | |
A reaction: Why? Is it better to understand deeply, or to act well? Can we just say there is objective good and subjective good, and they have little in common? Depressed heroes. |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The pleasantness of pleasure is not in dispute, but where we say the majority of pleasures are bad, though some are good, you are attributing goodness to all of them. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 13b) | |
A reaction: Bentham's plausible view is that the feeling of pleasure is always good, and the badness is in some other aspect of the event. Compare sadistic fantasy with sadistic action. |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is unlikely that the gods feel pleasure or the opposite. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 33b) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 383. |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d) | |
A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful. |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Intensity of pleasure and pain is to be found not in a good state of body and soul, but in a worthless one. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 45e) | |
A reaction: This just seems to be Plato's puritanism. How can you criticise someone for experience genuine intense pain? Experiencing intense pleasure is no crime, but pursuit of it might be. |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
Full Idea: A hedonist must say that someone who happens to be feeling pain rather than pleasure is, as long as the pain lasts, a bad man, even if he is the most virtuous man in the world. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 55b) |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Would you, Protarchus, gladly live your whole life experiencing only the greatest pleasure? Would you think you were still lacking anything? | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21a) | |
A reaction: the pleasure machine problem |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
Full Idea: A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is not the life of a human being, but the life of a jellyfish. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21c) |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. …One set of private interests would check another set of private interests. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who think a completely free market will evolve into a flourishing and just society. There is a basic debate about the importance of the character of the citizens in any polity. Marxists say they are entangled. |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Galston says responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtue: general (law-abiding, loyal), social (independent, open-minded), economic (diligent, restrained, adaptable), and political (respect, sensible, judgement, engagement). | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: [Galston's 'Liberal Purposes' 1991] (compressed) This immediately seems to be asking too much, especially for those who know little, or are short of money. |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: To defend Aristotelian republicanism it is not enough to show that individual require society - liberals do not deny this. They must also show that individuals need to be politically active. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. People are not just inactive because they have been rendered powerless. In any group of people there are some who are keen to have a voice, or lead, and others who are largely happy to follow. |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Minimal citizenship is often seen as simply requiring non-interference with others, but that ignores a basic requirement of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: He makes the point that the minimal requirement has to be given up when there is a crisis, which needs much more involvement. This largely describes modern Britain, prior to the Brexit rift. |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society …involves a radical extension of the obligations of liberal citizenship. The obligation to treat people as equal citizens now applies to everyday decisions. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This is very difficult for an older generation who felt their 'entitlement' as leading citizens, or who routinely favoured their local traditional community. But they just have to 'get over it'! |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: According to the New Right, to promote active citizenship-for-all or entitlements, we must focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Every creature has to earn a living, but one method is to successfully sponge off others. A cushy job is a sort of sponging. An excessively well paid job is a sort of sponging. Citizenship must involve responsibilities of some sort. |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Modern discussion has shifted from 'vote-centric' (or 'aggregative') to 'talk-centric' democracy. The vote-centric model has no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that a person's preferences betweent these two is a reflection of character, or basic attitudes to morality. Some people think democratically about their relationships, and others very obviously don't. |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: A liberal-democratic system is one in which those people who are subject to political authority have a right to participate in determining that authority. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: This applies to immigrants. The most anti-democratic move in recent democracies is the strategy of trying to make it more difficult to vote, perhaps by demanding identification documents, or creating huge queues. |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but the enrichment of private life. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Perhaps a sentiment expected more from a university lecturer than from a poorly-paid labourer. Does he mean watching innumerable TV shows instead of having sing-songs in the local pub? Increased leisure is indisputable. |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures that have preferred status. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This becomes tricky in schools, where the old way of teaching national literature and particular types of music has been eroded in modern times. But once wide diversity is allowed there is no single story which can be taught. |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberals need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect', and recognise the central role of nation-building in a democracy. …This means promoting a common language, and equal access to institutions operating in that language. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: 'Benign neglect' is non-interference with citizens' lives. Obviously the institutions include education, but is a state health service implied? Can equal access by guaranteed to private institutions? |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: On the view of 'differentiated citizenship', members of certain groups would be incorporated into the community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights would depend in part on their group membership. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: This is obviously a strategy to enable marginalised individuals to be fully included in society. The downside is that individuals gain their social identity through a label, rather than through themselves, which pure liberals dislike. 'Identity politics'. |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The evidence suggests that (contrary to the Marxist view) the status hierarchy is not reducible to the economic hierarchy. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka is particularly thinking of racism, which lowers the status of certain groups, even if they are economically successful. I console myself for my modest economic status by getting lots of education. |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Defending multiculturalism initially involved endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, and viewed minority rights as defending cohesive minority groups against the encroachment of liberal individualism. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.1) | |
A reaction: Liberal individualists have to accept these criticisms from Marxists, communitarians and multiculturalists. The lone individual has no group that guarantees support, and individuals (especially the young) can easily sink. |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The 'liberal culturalist' position is that minorities which share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Disabled liberals are an obvious example. This strikes me as a promising version of liberalism, which accepts the criticisms of extreme individualism. |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many feminists express concern that multiculturalism in practice typically means giving male members of the group the power to control the women in the group. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: The way the young are treated might also be a problem. The underlying question is whether the minority group is more or less civilised than the central state. Liberalism always fights for the rights of the least powerful. |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal defenders of multiculturalism must distinguish 'bad' minority rights which are restrictions from 'good' minority rights which supplement individual rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably no sensible liberal wants to remove all restrictions, so deeper values must be invoked to justify the mode of approved minority rights. A list of human goods seems needed. |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Why should national minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the majority? | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: A 'national minority' is marked by a different language, or a different religion, or both. No one doubts the majority's right to nation-build. Some further principle would be needed to deny that right to a minority. Maybe the minority was there first? |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal multiculturalism challenges status inequalities while preserving individual freedom. …Conservative multiculturalism replaces liberal principles with a communitarian politics of the common good, at least at the local or group level. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sounds a bit simplistic. Recent emphasis on 'the common good', in the face of white supremacists etc., seems admirable, but surely challenging inequalities promotes the common good? Minority cultures are often conservative. |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |