12 ideas
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The whole of quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.121) | |
| A reaction: Quine offers an interesting qualification to this crushing remark in Idea 13590. The point is that objects must retain their identity in modal contexts, as if I say 'John Kennedy might have been Richard Nixon'. What could that mean? |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The notion of essence makes sense in context. Relative to a particular enquiry, some predicates may play a more basic role than others, or may apply more fixedly; and these may be treated as essential. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.121) | |
| A reaction: Quine has got a bad press on essentialism, and on modal logic, but I take this point seriously. If you give something a fixed identity by means of essence in some context, you can then go ahead and apply possible world reasoning in that context. |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The very notion of necessity makes sense to me only relative to context. Typically it is applied to what is assumed in an inquiry, as against what has yet to transpire. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.121) | |
| A reaction: Lots of things are assumed by an inquiry without an assumption that they must be true. Quine is the greatest opponent of necessity in all of philosophy. Asserting necessities, though, is too much fun to give up. It would ruin philosophy. |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Talk of possible worlds is a graphic way of waging the essentialist philosophy, but it is only that; it is not an explication. Essence is needed to identify an object from one possible world to another. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.118) | |
| A reaction: He makes the proposal sound circular, but I take a commitment to essences to be prior to talk of possible worlds. Possible worlds are a tool for clarifying modalities, not for clarifying essential identities. |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A rigid designator differs from others in that it picks out its object by essential traits. It designates the object in all possible worlds in which it exists. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.118) | |
| A reaction: This states the point more clearly than Kripke ever does, and I presume it is right. Thus when we say that we wish 'our' Hubert Humphrey had won the election, we can allow that his victory elation would change him a bit. Kripke is right. |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs have been ascribed to machines, in support of a mechanistic philosophy, and I share this attitude. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.123) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Raymond Nelson] One suspects that this is Quine's latent behaviourism speaking. It strikes me as a crass misuse of 'belief' to ascribe it to a simple machine like a thermostat. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 23061 | Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray] |
| Full Idea: A free-thinking atheism would begin by questioning the prevailing faith in humanity. But there is little prospect of contemporary atheists giving up their reverence for this phantom. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Conc) | |
| A reaction: He seems to be referring to 'humanism', which I take to be quite different from atheism. I take it as obvious that simple atheism is entirely neutral on the question of whether we should have 'faith' in humanity (which presumably mean optimism). |
| 23057 | Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray] |
| Full Idea: Gnostic traditions envisage a supreme God that created the universe and then withdrew into itself, leaving the world to be ruled by a lesser god, or Demiurge, which might be indifferent or hostile to mankind. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It doesn't seem to solve any problems, given that the first God is 'supreme', and is therefore responsible for the introduction and actions of the later Demiurge. |
| 23056 | Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray] |
| Full Idea: It was only sometime around the sixth century BC, during the period when the Israelites returned to Jerusalem, that the idea that there is only one God emerged in Jewish religion. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a parallel move among the Greeks to elevate Zeus to special status. |
| 23055 | Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray] |
| Full Idea: The notion that religions are creeds - lists of propositions or doctrines that everyone must accept or reject - emerged only with Christianity. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: With a creed comes the possibility of heresy. I''m not happy with children being taught to recite something which begins 'I believe…', but which they have never thought about and barely understand. |
| 23058 | Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray] |
| Full Idea: Buddhism says nothing of any divine mind and rejects any idea of the soul. The world consists of processes and events. The human sense of self is an illusion; freedom is found in ridding oneself of this illusion. | |
| From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why shaking off the illusion of a self is a superior state. Freedom to do what? Presumably nothing at all, since there is no self to desire anything. |