18 ideas
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The paradigmatic referring devices are singular terms, denoting particular items. In English these include proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and a few others. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This list provides the agenda for twentieth century philosophy of language, since this is the point where language is supposed to hook onto the world. |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese). |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: How could we know whether a sentence is verifiable unless we already knew what it says? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a devastating objection to verificationism. Lycan suggests that you can formulate a preliminary meaning, without accepting true meaningfulness. Maybe verification just concerns truth, and not meaning. |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Could I not know the use of an expression and fall in with it, mechanically, but without understanding it? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: In a foreign country, you might successfully recite a long complex sentence, without understanding a single word. This doesn't doom the 'use' theory, but it means that quite a lot of detail needs to be filled in. |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Proper names pose a problem for the "use" theorist. Try stating a rule of use for the name 'William G. Lycan'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is normally used in connection with a particular human being, and is typically the subject of a grammatical sentence. Any piece of language could also be used to, say, attract someone's attention. |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A Davidsonian truth theory will not be able to distinguish the meaning of a sentence containing 'renate' from that of one containing 'cordate'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: One might achieve the distinction by referring to truth conditions in possible worlds, if there are possible worlds where some cordates are not renate. See Idea 7773. |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770. |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The possible worlds construal affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: e.g. entailment between sentences is just the subset relation - S1 entails S2 if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: We might want to separate the meanings of sentences from their entailments (though Brandom links them, see Idea 7765). |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I hardly think myself that ethics ought to be included in the domain of philosophy. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch.22) | |
| A reaction: He declines to give his reasons. The implication of the chapter is that ethics is essentially a social and political matter, so that individual ethical guidelines are unimportant. Maybe the woolliness of ethics was also an impediment. |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A sentence like 'You ought to do so-and-so' primarily has an emotional content. It means ' this is the act towards which I feel the emotion of approval'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: I don't understand how I can say 'you ought to do p', and very clearly mean that the situation would be altogether better if p, only to be told by some philosopher that what I thought was a sensible judgement is actually an emotional outburst. |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If harmonious desires are what we should seek, love is better than hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve the object of his desire. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful example of cool philosophical objectivity! Of course it is not true, because the fact that two people love one another doesn't not prevent them from having some incompatible desires, as every couple knows. |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Forty years later, Russell's famous filmed message to posteriority said exactly this. In decision making, get the facts; in relationships, show love and tolerance. I find both parts inspiring. |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| Full Idea: During and immediately after the war [14-18], those who hated the Germans were happier than those who still regarded them as human beings, because they could feel that what was being done served a good purpose. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: A striking remark. There are lots of situations where hatred seems to increase happiness. Russell is roughly defending consequentialism. |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Historically, virtue consisted at first of obedience to authority, whether that of the gods, the government, or custom. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Russell proceeds to demolish such a theory, which he finds it fairly easy to do. In Nietzsche's terms, he is only describing slave virtue. Each role in the world has its own virtues (and functions). Which gods are the most virtuous? |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The supreme moral rule should be: Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Russell makes no reference to Kant, but this is obviously intended to rebut the more rationalist Kantian view of what is imperative. The use of 'harmonious' chimes in best with Plato's account of the soul in 'Republic'. |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: To force a man to curb his desires, as we do by the criminal law, is not nearly so satisfactory as to cause him genuinely to feel the desires which promote socially harmonious conduct. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree, but improving the desires of selfish and even vicious people is a rather challenging task. |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: Russell suggested, in defence of an empiricist theory of time-awareness, that a sense organ goes on vibrating, like a piano string, for while after the stimulation. Thus we can see the movement of a second hand, seen in several places at once. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Realism' | |
| A reaction: Hm. If they were vibrating the last experience, they couldn't pick up the new one. When something fast happens the brain resonates fortissimo! If your eyes are moving it will be different neurons that get fired at each instant. |