18 ideas
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: It is a widely accepted thesis that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt goes on to defend this standard view (against Dummett's defence of S4). The point, I take it, is that one can only assert that something is 'true in all possible worlds' only when the worlds are all accessible to one another. |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is a modal element in consequence, in its applicability to assessing reasoning from suppositions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Our ordinary standards for deeming arguments to be sound vary greatly from context to context. Even the package tourist's syllogism ('It's Tuesday, so this is Belgium') may meet the operative standards for soundness. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: No doubt one could spell out the preconceptions of package tourist reasoning, and arrive at the logical form of the implication which is being offered. |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A rule is to be rejected if it enables us to deduce from some premisses a purported conclusion that does not follow from them in the broad sense. The idea that deductions answer to consequence is incomprehensible if consequence consists in deducibility. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Overt contradictions include formal contradictions of form 'B and not B', but I also take them to include 'This is red all over and green all over' and 'This is red and not coloured'. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The geometrical style of formalization of logic is now little more than a quaint anachronism, largely because it fails to show logical truths for what they are: simply by-products of rules of inference that are applicable to suppositions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of Russell-style axiom systems in favour of Gentzen-style natural deduction systems (starting from rules). Rumfitt quotes Dummett in support. |
18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Socrates and Plato are similar if they are both white. Yet the mind can express this either by an 'absolute concept' (as 'Socrates is white' and 'Plato is white'), or by a 'relative concept', as 'Socrates is similar to Plato with respect to whiteness. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], VI q.25), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7 | |
A reaction: Presumably he takes the facts of the matter to be the absolute concept, and the relative concept to be a contribution of the intellect. |
16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: When a piece of wood is divided in two halves, no new substance is generated. But there are now two substances, or the accidents of the two halves would be without a subject. They existed before hand, and were one piece of wood, but not in the same place. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], IV.19), quoted by Richard S. Westfall - Never at Rest: a biography of Isaac Newton 26.2 | |
A reaction: A nice example, demonstrating that there are substances within substances, contrary to the view of Duns Scotus. If a substance is just a subject for properties, it is hard to know what to make of this case. |
16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It is clear to the senses that hot water, if left to its own nature, reverts to coldness; this coldness cannot be caused by anything other than the substantial form of the water. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], III.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
A reaction: Unfortunately this is very bad science (even for its time), but it shows how many scholastics treated hylomorphism as a very physical and causal theory. |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
Full Idea: Rumfitt argues that there is a distinctive notion of necessity implicated in the notion of logical consequence. | |
From: report of Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: By the notion of 'logical necessity' I mean that there is a sense of 'necessary' for which 'It is necessary that A' implies and is implied by 'It is logically contradictory that not A'. ...From this, logical necessity is implicated in logical consequence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt expresses a commitment to classical logic at this point. We will need to be quite sure what we mean by 'contradiction', which will need a clear notion of 'truth'.... |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that any statement that is logically necessary (in the present sense) is knowable a priori. ..If a statement is logically necessary, its negation will yield a contradiction, but that does not imply that someone could know it. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dorothy Edgington, who holds the opposite view. Rumfitt largely defends McFetridge's view (q.v.). |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: While Fine suggests defining a narrow notion of logical necessity in terms of metaphysical necessity by 'restriction' (to logical truths that can be defined in non-modal terms), this seems unpromising for broad logical necessity, which is modal. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He cites Kit Fine 2002. Rumfitt glosses the non-modal definitions as purely formal. The metaphysics lurks somewhere in the proof. |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A world is usually taken to be a fully determinate way that things could have been; but then one might seriously wonder whether anyone is capable of 'considering' such a thing at all. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This has always worried me. If I say 'maybe my coat is in the car', I would hate to think that I had to be contemplating some entire possible world (including all the implications of my coat not being on the hat stand). |
9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It seems possible that the concept of a genus could be abstracted from one individual, let us say, the concept 'animal', as in the case of one approaching from a distance, when I see enough to judge that I am seeing an animal. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q xiii) | |
A reaction: This is a rather individualistic view of abstraction, ignoring the shared language and culture. It is hard to imagine a truly virgin mind coming up with the concept after one encounter. The concept 'mind-boggling' seems more likely. |
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The existence of an immaterial 'intellective soul' ..cannot be demonstrated; for every reason by which we try to prove it assumes something that is doubtful for a man who follows only his natural reason. Neither can it be proved by experience. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q x) | |
A reaction: This is splendid honesty from a medieval monk. How would such a clear thinker have responded to modern brain research? Colin McGinn still maintains William's view, despite modern knowledge. Our ignorance produced conceptual dualism. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: To love God above all means to love whatever God wills to be loved. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], III Q xiii) | |
A reaction: A striking thought, which could be meaningful to the non-religious. Is it possible to form an image of what a perfect and ideal mind would love most? This might generate a set of universal values. It is tricky to find out what an actual God loves. |