18 ideas
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both. |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'. |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2) |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5) |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'. |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma. |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'. |
7544 | Many people imagine that to experience is to understand [Goethe] |
Full Idea: There are many people who imagine that what they experience they also understand. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 889) | |
A reaction: This should be posted over the arrivals gate of every international airport, for returning holiday-makers. It seems to place Goethe on the rationalist side of the debate with empiricism. It is hard to explain 'understanding' in Humean terms. |
7541 | Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is [Goethe] |
Full Idea: Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 203) | |
A reaction: Nice. It is true, even when it is pointed out to us. No matter how hard we try to realise how very different animals are from us, we can't help identifying with them. Religious people even do it with inanimate creation. |
7543 | We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe] |
Full Idea: How can we learn self-knowledge? Never by taking thought, but rather by action. Try to do your duty and you'll soon discover what you're like. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 442) | |
A reaction: Good! I even like the unfashionable bit about duty. If you just do what you want, you will discover your interests, but not so much about your capacities. However, when you have to do something less comfortable, it is very revealing. |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic. |
7540 | Beauty is a manifestation of secret natural laws [Goethe] |
Full Idea: Beauty is a manifestation of secret natural laws which without this appearance would have remained eternally hidden from us. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 183) | |
A reaction: An interesting defence of beauty as an objective feature of the world. I'm not sure. Much beauty is indeed the result of growth or erosion expressing underlying laws, but then I have always thought there was a sexual component to visual beauty. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
7538 | The happiest people link the beginning and end of life [Goethe] |
Full Idea: The happiest man is one who can link the end of his life with its beginning. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 140) | |
A reaction: [from 'Art and Antiquity']. A nice thought, which chimes in with the idea that a good life is like a complete story or a work of art (Idea 7501), or that it is 'eudaimon'. |
7542 | The best form of government teaches us to govern ourselves [Goethe] |
Full Idea: You ask which form of government is the best? Whichever teaches us to govern ourselves. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 353) | |
A reaction: Not a fashionable view, since the rise of freedom as the highest political ideal, but I identify with the idea that a good government should educate, and should try to facilitate virtue as well as pleasure. |
7539 | To get duties from people without rights, you must pay them well [Goethe] |
Full Idea: If you demand duties from people and will not concede them rights, you have to pay them well. | |
From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 180) | |
A reaction: [from 'Art and Antiquity']. ...or have great power over them. Goethe gives the optimistic liberal view, rather than the Marxist view. |