10 ideas
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| Full Idea: The relationship between an object and its singleton is puzzling. Our intuitive conception of a set is a collection of objects - what are we to make of a collection of a single object? | |
| From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: The ontological problem seems to be the same as that of the empty set, and indeed the claim that a pair of entities is three things. For logicians the empty set is as real as a pet dog, but not for me. |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: We do not know the logical form of sentences about counterfactuals, probabilities, causal relations, belief, perception, intention, purposeful action, imperatives, optatives, or interrogatives, or the role of adverbs, adjectives or mass terms. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967], p.35) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is the famous 'Davidson programme', where teams of philosophers work out the logical forms for this lot, thus unravelling the logic of the world. If they are beavering away, some sort of overview should have emerged by now... |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| Full Idea: It is better not to include in the definition of abstract entities that they ontologically depend on their concrete correlates. Note: ..but they may depend on the totality of concreta; maybe 'the supervenience of the abstract' is part of ordinary thought. | |
| From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: [the quoted phrase is from Gideon Rosen] It certainly seems unlikely that the concept of the perfect hexagon depends on a perfect hexagon having existed. Human minds have intervened between the concrete and the abstract. |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| Full Idea: The vocabulary of geometry is sufficient to identify the circle, but could not be used to identify any circular paint patch. The reason must be that the circle lacks certain properties that can distinguish paint patches from one another. | |
| From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be support for the traditional view, that abstractions are created by omitting some of the properties of physical objects. I take them to be fictional creations, reified by language, and not actual hidden entities that have been observed. |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| Full Idea: In current discussions, abstract entities are usually distinguished as 1) in principle imperceptible, 2) incapable of causal interaction, 3) not located in space-time. The first is often explained by the second, which is in turn explained by the third. | |
| From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Szabó concludes by offering 3 as the sole criterion of abstraction. As Lewis points out, the Way of Negation for defining abstracta doesn't tell us very much. Courage may be non-spatiotemporal, but what about Alexander the Great's courage? |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's main argument in favour of his truth conditions theory of meaning is that compositionality is needed to account for our understanding of long, novel sentences, and a sentence's truth condition is its most obviously compositional feature. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: This seems to me exactly right. As we hear a new long sentence unfold, we piece together the meaning. At the end we may spot that the meaning is silly, or an unverifiable speculation, or not what the speaker intended - but it is too late! It means. |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Davidson thinks that Frege's model for a theory of semantic value (and thereby for a systematic theory of sense) is unsatisfactory, because it provides no useful or explanatory account of how sentence-meaning can be a function of word-meaning. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 8.1 | |
| A reaction: Put like that, it is not clear to me how you could even start to explain how word-meaning contributes to sentence meaning. Try speaking any sentence slowly, and observe how the sentence meaning builds up. Truth is, of course, relevant. |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's response to the problem of how you would state truth conditions for "I am sick now" ...is to relativize its truth to a particular speaker and a time. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Lycan is not happy with this, but it seems a reasonable way to treat the truth of any statement containing indexicals. Never mind the 'truth conditions theory of meaning' - just ask whether "I am sick now" is true. |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The concern of some philosophers has been expressed by saying that whereas Tarski took translation for granted, and sought to understand truth, Davidson takes truth for granted, and seeks to understand translation. | |
| From: comment on Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.82 | |
| A reaction: We can just say that the two concepts are interdependent, but my personal intuitions side with Davidson. If you are going to take something as fundamental and axiomatic, truth looks a better bet than translation. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |