7 ideas
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
18424 | If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation. | |
From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2 | |
A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |