Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence' and 'The Road to Serfdom'

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13 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The 'deductivist' version of eliminativist structuralism avoids ontological commitments to mathematical objects, and to modal vocabulary. Mathematics is formulations of various (mostly categorical) theories to describe kinds of concrete structures.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], 1)
     A reaction: 'Concrete' is ambiguous here, as mathematicians use it for the actual working maths, as opposed to the metamathematics. Presumably the structures are postulated rather than described. He cites Russell 1903 and Putnam. It is nominalist.
Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The 'non-eliminative' version of mathematical structuralism takes it to be a fundamental insight that mathematical objects are really just positions in abstract mathematical structures.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I)
     A reaction: The point here is that it is non-eliminativist because it is committed to the existence of mathematical structures. I oppose this view, since once you are committed to the structures, you may as well admit a vast implausible menagerie of abstracta.
'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The 'modal' version of eliminativist structuralism lifts the deductivist ban on modal notions. It studies what necessarily holds in all concrete models which are possible for various theories.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I)
     A reaction: [He cites Putnam 1967, and Hellman 1989] If mathematical truths are held to be necessary (which seems to be right), then it seems reasonable to include modal notions, about what is possible, in its study.
'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: 'Set-theoretic' structuralism rejects deductive nominalism in favour of a background theory of sets, and mathematics as the various structures realized among the sets. This is often what mathematicians have in mind when they talk about structuralism.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I)
     A reaction: This is the big shift from 'mathematics can largely be described in set theory' to 'mathematics just is set theory'. If it just is set theory, then which version of set theory? Which axioms? The safe iterative conception, or something bolder?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Structuralism can be distinguished from traditional Platonism in that it denies that mathematical objects from the same structure are ontologically independent of one another
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III)
     A reaction: My instincts strongly cry out against all versions of this. If you are going to be a platonist (rather as if you are going to be religious) you might as well go for it big time and have independent objects, which will then dictate a structure.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Against extreme views that all mathematical objects depend on the structures to which they belong, or that none do, I defend a compromise view, that structuralists are right about algebraic objects (roughly), but anti-structuralists are right about sets.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], Intro)
In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If objects depend on the other objects, this would mean an 'upward' dependence, in that they depend on the structure to which they belong, where the physical realm has a 'downward' dependence, with structures depending on their constituents.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III)
     A reaction: This nicely captures an intuition I have that there is something wrong with a commitment primarily to 'structures'. Our only conception of such things is as built up out of components. Not that I am committing to mathematical 'components'!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: We can give an exhaustive account of the identity of the empty set and its singleton without mentioning infinite sets, and it might be possible to defend the view that one natural number depends on its predecessor but not vice versa.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], V)
     A reaction: Linnebo uses this as one argument against mathematical structuralism, where the small seems to depend on the large. The view of sets rests on the iterative conception, where each level is derived from a lower level. He dismisses structuralism of sets.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: There are two main ways of spelling out an 'intrinsic' property: if and only if it is shared by every duplicate of an object, ...and if and only if the object would have this property even if the rest of the universe were removed or disregarded.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], II)
     A reaction: [He cites B.Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopaedia article] How about an intrinsic property being one which explains its identity, or behaviour, or persistence conditions?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialist economics needs a very strong central power, virtually leading to slavery [Hayek, by Oksala]
     Full Idea: Hayek argues that socialist economic equality can only be effectively put into practice by a strong, dictatorial government. Planning has to be imposed by force, and centralised economic power creates a dependency scarcely distingishable from slavery.
     From: report of F.A. Hayek (The Road to Serfdom [1944]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.7
     A reaction: I don't see much sign of the post-war British Labour government being anything like this, even though they nationalised the railways and introduce a national health service. Hayek was mesmerised by Russia.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Hayek was a liberal, but mainly concerned with market freedom [Hayek, by Dunt]
     Full Idea: Hayek was a liberal (rather than a conservative), …but the individual liberty he cared about was not diversity or freedom of thought. It was freedom to operate in the market.
     From: report of F.A. Hayek (The Road to Serfdom [1944]) by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
     A reaction: There seems to have been a drift from obsession with freedom to participate in the market, towards the less plausible idea that market forces can solve everything. I once met someone who was convinced the market could solve environmental problems.
Impeding the market is likely to lead to extensive state control [Hayek]
     Full Idea: Once the free working of the market is impeded beyond a certain degree, the planner will be forced to extend his controls until they become all comprehensive.
     From: F.A. Hayek (The Road to Serfdom [1944]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
     A reaction: Hayek was terrified of totalitarianism (quite reasonably), but fascism and communism don't seem to have arisen in the way he describes. I'm not clear why sensible intervention in the market should slide down into nightmare.