25 ideas
10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Henkin semantics (for second-order logic) specifies a second domain of predicates and relations for the upper case constants and variables. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3) | |
A reaction: This second domain is restricted to predicates and relations which are actually instantiated in the model. Second-order logic is complete with this semantics. Cf. Idea 10756. |
10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: In addition to standard and Henkin semantics for second-order logic, one might also employ substitutional or game-theoretical or topological semantics, or Boolos's plural interpretation, or even a semantics inspired by Lesniewski. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3) | |
A reaction: This is helpful in seeing the full picture of what is going on in these logical systems. |
10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic raises doubts because of its ontological commitment to the set-theoretic hierarchy, and the allegedly problematic epistemic status of the second-order consequence relation. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §1) | |
A reaction: The 'epistemic' problem is whether you can know the truths, given that the logic is incomplete, and so they cannot all be proved. Rossberg defends second-order logic against the second problem. A third problem is that it may be mathematics. |
10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Logical consequence is intuitively taken to be a semantic notion, ...and it is therefore the formal semantics, i.e. the model theory, that captures logical consequence. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2) | |
A reaction: If you come at the issue from normal speech, this seems right, but if you start thinking about the necessity of logical consequence, that formal rules and proof-theory seem to be the foundation. |
10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Deductive consequence, written Γ|-S, is loosely read as 'the sentence S can be deduced from the sentences Γ', and semantic consequence Γ|=S says 'all models that make Γ true make S true as well'. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2) | |
A reaction: We might read |= as 'true in the same model as'. What is the relation, though, between the LHS and the RHS? They seem to be mutually related to some model, but not directly to one another. |
10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: A proof-theorist could insist that the logical form of a sentence is exhibited by the logical constants that it contains. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2) | |
A reaction: You have to first get to the formal logical constants, rather than the natural language ones. E.g. what is the truth table for 'but'? There is also the matter of the quantifiers and the domain, and distinguishing real objects and predicates from bogus. |
10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: A standard model is a set of objects called the 'domain', and an interpretation function, assigning objects in the domain to names, subsets to predicate letters, subsets of the Cartesian product of the domain with itself to binary relation symbols etc. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3) | |
A reaction: The model actually specifies which objects have which predicates, and which objects are in which relations. Tarski's account of truth in terms of 'satisfaction' seems to be just a description of those pre-decided facts. |
10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: A mathematical theory is 'categorical' if, and only if, all of its models are isomorphic. Such a theory then essentially has just one model, the standard one. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3) | |
A reaction: So the term 'categorical' is gradually replacing the much-used phrase 'up to isomorphism'. |
10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: All that should be required to get a semantics relative to which a given deductive system is complete is a sufficiently cunning model-theorist. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §5) |
10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
Full Idea: No deductive system is semantically incomplete in and of itself; rather a deductive system is incomplete with respect to a specified formal semantics. | |
From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3) | |
A reaction: This important point indicates that a system might be complete with one semantics and incomplete with another. E.g. second-order logic can be made complete by employing a 'Henkin semantics'. |
7621 | Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein] |
Full Idea: Einstein's interpretation of special relativity was operationalist in spirit (in marked contrast to the interpretation he gave to general relativity). | |
From: comment on Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |
A reaction: The late twentieth century was polluted with daft relativism, and I hold Einstein partly responsible, suspecting that he was a bad philosopher. The later development of Einstein's view noted here is interesting. |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
22955 | Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield] |
Full Idea: It is difficult to overplay Einstein's commitment to the concept of causality as the bedrock of physics. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by P Coveney / R Highfield - The Arrow of Time 3 'problem' | |
A reaction: I normally avoid arguments from authority, but this carries a bit of weight (e.g. when Russell tries to oppose it). What happens to Einstein's theories if you remove causation from them? |
20638 | General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein came to general relativity from the principles that the laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Cosmological' | |
A reaction: I wish physicists would tell us a bit more about the ontological status of the 'laws of nature'. Presumably they are not supernatural, so there is an aspect of nature which is constant in all frames of reference. Explanation please. |
20636 | Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein's general relativity included Newton's theory as a special case: Newton's theory corresponds to the speed of light being infinite relative to the speed of the interacting bodies. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity' | |
A reaction: So Newton's theory was NOT wrong, but he made the false assumption that the speed of light was infinite. |
21230 | The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein's first theory is 'special' because it only deals with observers who move in a straight line at constant speeds with respect to one another. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: Most theories of this period seem to have focused on the simplest cases, for obvious reasons. |
21231 | Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein assumed that when each observer measures the speed of light in a vacuum, they find the same value, regardless of their speed; and that measurements will lead to agreement on the laws of physics. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: So are the laws of physics constant for all observers, irrespective of their speed? |
20634 | General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein's General Theory arose from the idea that there is no absolute measure of force and acceleration. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity' | |
A reaction: If absolutely everything is only true relative to something else you wonder what the point of measuring anything is. How big can a 'frame of reference' or 'inertial frame' be. Is the multiverse a frame of reference? |
20648 | Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein] |
Full Idea: The mass of a body is the measure of its energy content. | |
From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 04 'Intro' | |
A reaction: If I knew what energy was, this would be very illuminating. This idea is e=mc^2 in words. We now have the Higgs field to consider when trying to understand mass. |
21232 | Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein noted that the measurements of space and time are not independent but inextricably linked, leading to the idea of unified space-time (introduced by his former teacher Minkowski). | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: Notice the instrumentalist assumptions behind this. |
7626 | I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein] |
Full Idea: I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly. | |
From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Richard Dawkins - The God Delusion Ch.1.15 | |
A reaction: This is an important corrective to those who claim Einstein as religious, on the basis of remarks about God not playing dice etc. See the whole of Dawkins's chapter on Einstein for full discussion. |