83 ideas
| 15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics, for the conventionalist, is not a matter of trying to see deeply into the structure of mind-independent reality, but of trying to clarify the way we actually speak and think, and perhaps negotiating ways of doing this to our best advantage. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Note that he is still allowing space for 'revisionary' as well as for 'descriptive' metaphysics. I can't wholly accept this, as I really do think we can have some deep insights into reality, but Sidelle is articulating a large part of the truth. |
| 15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Judgments of necessity seem always to be based on thought experiments and appeals to what we can imagine. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, the denial of this thing seems inconceivable. I would say that they are also based on coherence. The idea that we can think without imagination is nonsense. |
| 15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I file this under 'Dispositions' to show what is at stake in the debate about dispositional and categorical properties. I take a commitment to dispositions to be a commitment to modal facts about the actual world. |
| 15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Even if the causal theory of reference proper does not presuppose essentialism, it does presuppose essentialism if it is to be an account of reference to modally extended entities. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) |
| 15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: It is clear, of course, that if there are true essential predications, then they express necessary properties. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I would certainly want to ask whether essences have to be analysed as properties, and also (more boldly) whether there might not be contingent essences. |
| 15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The property of being a deepest explanatory feature is a nonmodal property: it's an actual property. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept the existence of properties of the form 'being-F'. The possibility of securing a door may be the deepest explanatory feature of a lock. [To be fair to Sidelle, see context - just for once!] Dispositions are actual. |
| 15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The necessity to water of whatever is found out to be the water's microstructure is given by convention, and is not something which is discovered. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A powerful point. It shows the authority of science that we accept the microstructure as the essence. The essences of statues and people are definitely not their microstructures. One H2O molecule isn't water. Why not? Macro-properties count too! |
| 15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Independent of conventions, no definite sense can be given to the notion of 'the same stuff as this'. So reference-fixing must include some principle of individuation to determine the aspects of sameness for the identity referred to. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Is he really saying that we don't understand 'same stuff as this'? Surely animals can manage that, and they are not famous for their conventions. Sidelle has fallen into the sortalist trap, I think. |
| 15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: In the evaluation of de dicto modal statements, whether some possible state of affairs is relevant to its truth does not depend on the identity of its objects, as in 'Necessarily, the President of the USA is male'. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a more clear-cut and easy to grasp criterion than most that are on offer. |
| 15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
| Full Idea: Sidelle defends conventionalism against a posteriori necessities by 'factoring' a necessary a posteriori truth into an analytic component and a nonmodal component. The modal force then comes from the analytic part, and the a posteriority from the other. | |
| From: report of Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 12.8 | |
| A reaction: [I note that Sidelle refers, it seems, to the nonmodal component as a 'deep explanatory feature', which is exactly what I take an essence to be]. |
| 15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: What we need to know, in order to know what is empirically necessary, is some empirical fact plus our conventions that tell us which truths are necessary given which empirical facts. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I take this attack on a posteriori necessities to be the most persuasive part of Sidelle's case, but you can't just put all of our truths down to convention. There are stabilities in the world, as well as in our conventions. |
| 15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The necessary a posteriori crudely divides into two groups - (synthetic) identity statements (between rigid designators), and statements of essential properties. The latter is either statements of property identity, or of the essences of natural kinds. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: He cites Kripke's examples (Hesperus,Cicero,Truman,water,gold), and divides them into the two groups. Helpful. |
| 15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: In the traditional empiricist picture, we go about modal enquiry by trying to see whether we can imagine a situation in which it would be correct to assert the negation of a proposed necessary truth. Thus we can find out the limits of our concepts. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) |
| 15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Contradictoriness is the boundary both of what is possible and also of what is imaginable. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Of course we may see contradictions where there are none, and fail to grasp real hidden contradictions, so the two do not coincide in the practice. I think I would say it is 'a' boundary, not 'the' boundary. |
| 15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: It is not merely the modal facts that result from our conventions, but the individuals and kinds that are modally involved. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I am beginning to find Sidelle's views very sympathetic - going over to the Dark Side, I'm afraid. But conventions won't work at all if they don't correspond closely to reality. |
| 15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: For a term to be rigid, it is said there must be real transworld identity prior to our use of the rigid term, ..but this may only be because we have conventional principles for individuating across worlds. 'Let's call him Fred' - perhaps explicitly rigid. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems right. An example might be a comic book character, who retains a perfect identity in all the comics, with no scars, weight change, or ageing. |
| 15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: 'Dthat' is Kaplan's indexical operator; it operates on a given singular term, φ, and makes it into a rigid designator of whatever φ designates in the original context. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6 n11) | |
| A reaction: I like this idea a lot, because it strikes me that referring to something rigidly is a clear step beyond referring to it in actuality. I refer to 'whoever turns up each week', but that is hardly rigid. The germ of 2-D semantics is here. |
| 15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The a priori method yields a priori knowledge, and the objects of this knowledge are not facts about the world, but analytic truths. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Are we not allowed any insights at all into how the world must be, independent of how we happen to conceptualise it? |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
| 15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: If water is essentially H2O, this is going to have something to do with our intentions in using 'water'. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This very simple point looks to be correct, and raises very important questions about the whole Twin Earth thing. When new discoveries are made, words shift their meanings. We're not quite sure what 'jade' means any more. |
| 15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of reference appears to give us a way to get at an object while leaving it undetermined what its essence or necessary features might be. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints why the direct/causal theory of reference seems to open the doors to scientific essentialism. Sidelle, of course, opposes the whole programme. |
| 15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The phenomenon of overlapping entities requires that if our reference is to be determinate (as determinate as it is), then there must be analytic principles of individuation. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: His point is that there is something inescapably conventional about the way in which our reference works. It isn't just some bald realist baptism. |
| 19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The good man is he whose goodness is not Christian, but rather political, in the sense I have given. Such a man loves the laws of his land and is moved to act by them. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I take this to have a lot in common with Aristotle, whose simple slogan for virtue I take to as 'be a good citizen'. |
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
| A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
| A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
| A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
| A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
| A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
| A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
| A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
| A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
| A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
| A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
| A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |
| 20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: What civil law could prevent a slave from running away? Since he is not a member of society, why should the laws of society concern him? | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Does this apply to children, who can't vote or stand for office? |
| 20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing good about the nature of slavery. The slave can achieve nothing by being virtuous. The master acquires all sorts of bad habits, and is accustomed to behaving with a total lack of moral virtues. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.01) | |
| A reaction: Most slavery of that time took place in colonies, far remote from the moral judgments of the mother country. The temptations of such power over others are far too great for most masters to live virtuously. |
| 20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The demand for slavery is the demand for luxury and voluptuousness; it has nothing to do with concern for public felicity. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
| A reaction: True monarchists and aristocratic elitists presumably think that a society should have one part which lives in great luxury. Where else are the fine arts and wonderful buildings going to come from? |
| 20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: If a state is to enjoy and preserve liberty, everyone must be able to say what he thinks. In a free state, therefore, a citizen may speak and write anything not expressly forbidden by the laws. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.27) | |
| A reaction: A commonplace now, but fairly bold then. I blame Freeborn John Lilburne for wild ideas like these. |
| 19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a society where laws exist, liberty can consist only in being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being contrained to do what one ought not to will. ...If a citizen could do what the law prohibits, all others would have the same power. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.03) | |
| A reaction: This sounds pretty quaint in 2017, but I love it. |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
| 19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is corrupted in two ways: when it loses the spirit of equality, and when the spirit of equality becomes extreme, that is, when everyone wishes to be the equal of those he has chosen to command him. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.02) | |
| A reaction: The latter seems to be what happens when a referendum is called (as in Brexit 2016). The winners come to despise the elected representatives, if the latter disagree with the outcome. |
| 19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Equality is so difficult that exactitude is not possible. It is enough to place citizens by a census within categories that reduce or fix differences. Then laws compensate for inequalities by taxes on the rich and relief given to the poor. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Placing citizens within categories (e.g. 'nobility') has long gone out of fashion. He doesn't say whether you tax the capital or the income of the rich. |
| 19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In some cases, equality among citizens may be denied by democracy for the utility of democracy. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
| A reaction: He cites people who make sacrifices for the public, and lower orders who are getting above themselves! The desire for equality quickly comes into conflict with other values. |
| 19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The relations of equity precede the positive laws that establish them. It is right to conform to laws in a society; intelligent beings should be grateful for benefits; we remain dependent on those who create us; an injury merits the same in return. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
| A reaction: [the examples are compressed] A nice statement of the idea of natural law. It doesn't follow that because an injury merits retaliation, that it should be implemented (just that no one can complain if it happens). |
| 19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Animals have natural laws because they are united by sensation, ...but they do not invariably follow thieir natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, which have neither knowledge nor sensation. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: With the example of vegetables the concept of natural law is drifting into the laws of nature, and evidently Montesquie makes no sharp distinction here. |
| 20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is permissible to put a criminal to death because the law that punishes him was made to protect him. For example, a murderer has enjoyed the benefits of the law by which he is condemned. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: Dubious! We could add torture, and life imprisonment for parking offences, if this argument is sufficient justification. |
| 20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When religion teaches that human actions are predetermined, penalties imposed by law ought to be more severe, for without these measures men would behave with complete abandon. If the dogma of religion is free will, the situation is altogether different. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.14) | |
| A reaction: Presumably persuasion and influence come into the free will picture. Calvinist Geneva was determinist, and Catholic France for free will. |
| 20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: War can confer only one right over captives, and that is to ensure that they no longer harm victors. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: He is arguing against both the killing of captives, and their enslavement. |
| 19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The power of the clergy is as dangerous in a republic, as it is appropriate to a monarchy. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: This makes me look at the UK in a new light, with the clergy hovering around when the monarch is crowned, and the bishops sitting by right in the House of Lords. |
| 19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In these [despotic] states, religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to fear. The peoples of the Mohammedan empires in part derive from their religion their extraordinary veneration for their rulers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.14) | |
| A reaction: I suppose religions have submission to authority built into them. |
| 20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Religion can support the state when the laws themselves lack the power to do so. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.16) | |
| A reaction: A thought which didn't occur to Spinoza, but then the thought merely confirms that religion offers a rival to the rule of law. |
| 20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Louis XIII was made extremely uneasy by the law that enslaved all the negroes in his colonies. But when told that this was the most efficacious way of converting them, he gave his consent. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.04) | |
| A reaction: That is a spectaculary bad advert for giving an established religion a leading role in society. It is relevant to the upbringing of children, as well as to slaves. |
| 19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Just as the purpose of education in monarchies is to ennoble men's hearts, so its purpose in despotic states is to debase them. In despotic states education must be servile. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.03) | |
| A reaction: This is an early insight into the way that all social institutions, such as education, are largely pawns of a larger political system. |
| 19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is when we instruct others that we can best practice that general virtue which teaches us to love everyone. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Preface) | |
| A reaction: A very nice thought. One tricky issue is that some people dislike, and even resent, being taught. If we all just adored both teaching and learning, we would be in a sort of paradise, but it doesn't seem to happen. |
| 19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Laws, in the broadest meaning of the term, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
| A reaction: Montesquieu is about to discuss social laws, but this is the clearest statement I have ever met of the essentialist view of the laws of nature. |
| 15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Is there anything in the procedures of scientists that could reveal to them that water is necessarily H2O or that gold necessarily has atomic number 79. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's is view, that empirical evidence can never reveal necessities. Given that we know some necessities, you have an argument for rationalism. |