Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Frege's Theory of Numbers' and 'Without Immediate Justification'

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8 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8851	Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2)
	A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8849	Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1)
	A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8853	Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

8855	Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification

8852	In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3)
	A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3158	Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
	A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance

3159	Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
	A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.