Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Metaphysics' and 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff

16771	A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
	Full Idea: A composite entity is a unum per se if the partial entities that are in it are contained under one common essence. …In water, all those parts are contained under one essence of water.
	From: Chistoph Scheibler (Metaphysics [1650], I.4.1 n9), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: Water mixed with wine is said to be an 'ens per accidens'. This is an unusual but possible view, that all the water there is is a single thing, united by its compositional essence. When we talk about 'water', we include possible water, and past water.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3158	Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
	A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7658	Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
	Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
	A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self

7655	The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
	Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance

3159	Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
	A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7657	Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
	Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

7656	I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
	Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence

7654	What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
	A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.