25 ideas
20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: One possible answer is that Zeno is wrong because it is not true that by accumulating an infinite number of things one ends up with an infinite thing. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 01) | |
A reaction: I do love it when deep and complex ideas are expressed with perfect simplicity. As long as the simple version is correct. |
20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of 'things' which are in this or that state, but in terms of 'processes' instead. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world of quantum mechanics is not a world of objects: it is a world of events. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: I presume a philosopher is allowed to ask what an 'event' is. Since, as Rovelli tells it, time is eliminated from the picture, events seem to be unanalysable primitives. |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly. |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with. |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view. |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me. |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role. |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener. |
20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: 'Infinite', ultimately, is the name that we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 11) |
20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The notions of fields and particles, separated by Faraday and Maxwell, end up merging in quantum mechanics. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: This sounds to me just like Anaximander's 'apeiron' - the unlimited [Rovelli agrees! p.168]. Anaximander predicted the wall which enquiry would hit, but we now have more detail. |
20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Since the energy of the electromagnetic field can take on only certain values, the field behaves like a set of packets of energy. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: There are about fifteen fields, whose quanta are elementary particles (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, Higgs, and little else), plus a few fields similar to the electromagnetic one, which describe forces at a nuclear scale, with quanta like photons. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: According to Rovelli, this sentence describes the essence of physical reality. |
20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world is not made up of fields and particles, but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There are no longer particles which move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen in spacetime. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: If you are not a scientist, there is (I find) a strong tendency to read and digest stuff like this, and then forget it the next day, because it so far from our experience. Folk like me have to develop two parallel views of the nature of reality. |
20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Electrons don't always exist. They exist when they interact. They materialize when they collide with something. The quantum leap from one orbit to another constitutes their way of being real. An electron is a combination of leaps between interactions. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: If a philosopher with an Aristotelian interest in the nature of matter wants to grasp the modern view, the electron looks like the thing to focus on. You can feel Rovelli battling here to find formulations that might satisfy a philosopher. |
20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Schrödinger's wave is a bad image for an electron, because when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04 note) | |
A reaction: And yet there is the diffusion in the two-slit experiment, which Thomas Young discovered for light. I must take Rovelli's word for this. |
20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Quantum Theory does not describe things as they are: it describes how things occur and interact with each other. It doesn't describe where there is a particle but how it shows itself to others. The world of existence is reduced to possible interactions. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: Fans of 'process philosophy' should like this, though he is not denying that there may be facts about how things are - it is just that this is not mentioned in the theory. There is not much point in philosophers yearning to know the reality. |
20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: I think that quantum mechanics has revealed three aspects of the nature of things: granularity, indeterminacy, and the relational structure of the world. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world is made up of particles + fields, and nothing else; there is no need to add space as an extra ingredient. Newton's space is the gravitational field. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 03) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that particles are just bumps or waves in the fields [yes! Rovelli p.110], which would mean there are fields and nothing else. And no one seems to know what a field is. |
20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: It is always heat and only heat that distinguishes the past from the future. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 12) | |
A reaction: I can remember the past but not the future - so can that fact be reduced to facts about heat? |