Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics' and 'Paper of December 1676'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta

10414	Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3
	A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

10415	Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties
	A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3158	Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
	A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies

12727	It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: If it could be supposed that a body exists without a mind, then a man would do everything in the same way as if he did not have a mind, and men would speak and write the same things, without knowing what they do. ...But this supposition is impossible.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Paper of December 1676 [1676], A6.3.400), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
	A reaction: This is clearly the zombie dream, three centuries before Robert Kirk's modern invention of the idea. Leibniz's reason for denying the possibility of zombies won't be the modern physicalist reason.

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance

3159	Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
	A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.