Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Mathematics and Indispensibility' and 'Principles of Politics'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
     Full Idea: If mathematical statements are part of every competing hypothesis, then no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of observations, they will be part of the best hypothesis. They are not tested, but are a background assumption.
     From: Elliott Sober (Mathematics and Indispensibility [1993], 45), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is a very nice objection to the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is confirmed by the ongoing successes of science.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
     Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
     A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant]
     Full Idea: Lliberty is the triumph of the individual, as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods, as over the masses who seek to render the minority the slave of the majority.
     From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4
     A reaction: [No page given] Dunt describes Constant's book as the first really systematic account of liberalism. Very important to have rights against the majority, as well as against government.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant]
     Full Idea: To defend the rights of minorities is to defend the rights of all. Everyone in turn finds himself in the minority.
     From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4
     A reaction: Very conformist people, who are often the most oppressive, are rarely in the minority, and are unlikely to be impressed by this idea.