Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Mathematics and Indispensibility' and 'De arcanus motus'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
9558 All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
     Full Idea: If mathematical statements are part of every competing hypothesis, then no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of observations, they will be part of the best hypothesis. They are not tested, but are a background assumption.
     From: Elliott Sober (Mathematics and Indispensibility [1993], 45), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is a very nice objection to the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is confirmed by the ongoing successes of science.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12733 Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The primary mechanical axiom is that the whole cause and the entire effect have the same power [potentia]. ..This depends on the definition of cause, effect and power.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De arcanus motus [1676], 203), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: This is a useful reminder that if one is going to build a metaphysics on powers (which I intend to do), then the conservation laws in physics are highly relevant.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12734 Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every necessary proposition is demonstrable, at least by someone who understands it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De arcanus motus [1676], 203), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: This kind of optimism leads to the crisis of the Hilbert Programme in the 1930s. Gödel seems to have conclusively proved that Leibniz was wrong. What would Leibniz have made of Gödel?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
     Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
     A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.