20 ideas
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
Full Idea: For a language L there is a predicate 'true-in-L' which one can employ for all scientific purposes in place of intuitive truth, and this predicate admits of a precise definition using only the vocabulary of L itself plus set theory. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He refers, of course, to Tarski's theory. I'm unclear of the division between 'scientific purposes' and the rest of life (which is why some people embrace 'minimal' theories of ordinary truth). I'm struck by set theory being a necessary feature. |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
Full Idea: In modern notation we can consider potential logical principles that Aristotle never considered because of his general practice of looking at inferences each of whose premises involved exactly two class-names. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably you can build up complex inferences from a pair of terms, just as you do with pairs in set theory. |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
Full Idea: On its modern interpretation, the validity of the inference 'All S are M; All M are P; so All S are P' just expresses the transitivity of the relation 'subclass of'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A simple point I've never quite grasped. Since lots of syllogisms can be expressed as Venn Diagrams, in which the circles are just sets, it's kind of obvious really. So why does Sommers go back to 'terms'? See 'Term Logic'. |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The symbol '⊃' (read 'if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' ('if Px then Qx') is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: So ⊃ and → are just abbreviations, and not really a proper part of the language. Notoriously, though, this is quite a long way from what 'if...then' means in ordinary English, and it leads to paradoxical oddities. |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
Full Idea: In the theory of types, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type, where individuals count as the zero type, sets of individuals as type one, sets of sets of individuals as type two. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.6) |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
Full Idea: It was essentially the failure to develop a logic of relations that trivialised the logic studied before the end of the nineteenth century. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: De Morgan, Peirce and Frege were, I believe, the people who put this right. |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The natural understanding of first-order logic is that in writing down first-order schemata we are implicitly asserting their validity, that is, making second-order assertions. ...Thus even quantification theory involves reference to classes. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If, as a nominalist, you totally rejected classes, presumably you would get by in first-order logic somehow. To say 'there are no classes so there is no logical validity' sounds bonkers. |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Today, the tendency among philosophers is to assume that in no sense does logic itself have an empirical foundation. I believe this tendency is wrong. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: I agree, not on the basis of indispensability to science, but on the basis of psychological processes that lead from experience to logic. Russell and Quine are Putnam's allies here, and Frege is his opponent. Putnam developed a quantum logic. |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Instead of identifying functions with certain sets, I might have identified sets with certain functions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9) |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I don't think all substitution-instances of a valid schema are 'true'; some are clearly meaningless, such as 'If all boojums are snarks and all snarks are egglehumphs, then all boojums are egglehumphs'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems like a very good challenge to Quine's claim that it is only form which produces a logical truth. Keep deductive and semantic consequence separate, with two different types of 'logical truth'. |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Sets of a very high type or very high cardinality (higher than the continuum, for example) should today be investigated in an 'if-then' spirit. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This attitude goes back to Hilbert, but it fits with Quine's view of what is indispensable for science. It is hard to see a reason for the cut-off, just looking at the logic of expanding sets. |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Nominalists must at heart be materialists, or so it seems to me: otherwise their scruples are unintelligible. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is modern nominalism - the rejection of abstract objects. I largely plead guilty to both charges. |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Physics is full of references to such 'non-physical' entities as state-vectors, Hamiltonians, Hilbert space etc. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I take these to be concepts which are 'abstracted' from the physical facts, and so they don't strike me as being much of an ontological problem, or an objection to nominalism (which Putnam takes them to be). |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Scientists want successful predictions in order to confirm their theories; they do not want theories in order to obtain the predictions, which are in some cases of not the slightest interest in themselves. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Equally, we might only care about the prediction, and have no interest at all in the theory. Farmers want weather predictions, not a PhD in meteorology. |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
8044 | Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung. | |
From: report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc. |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |