18244
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I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
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Full Idea:
Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power.
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From:
Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4
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A reaction:
Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects.
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8044
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Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre]
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Full Idea:
Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung.
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From:
report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3
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A reaction:
A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc.
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7657
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Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
[Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
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7656
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I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
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