Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Summa' and 'Resurrecting Biological Essentialism'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
16616 Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
     A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16585 Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Essentialism is concerned with the nature of a group, whatever the category it falls under.
     From: Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 6)
     A reaction: This seems to me such a simple and obvious point that I am amazed that anyone rejects it, yet lots of people seem to think that an essence is just some sort of category.
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
     Full Idea: An intrinsic essence does not have to be 'neat and tidy'. ...Essentialism can accept the gradual change of one thing into another.
     From: Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 11)
     A reaction: My thesis is that essentialism is a response to the needs of explanation, so as long as there is some core explanation to be found, even in something transitory, then the concept of an essence can apply to it.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
     A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
     A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Our explanatory purposes in introducing a name for a species demand that we draw the lines around a group that is small enough to share a whole lot of important properties and large enough to yield broad generalizations.
     From: Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 10 'Arb')
     A reaction: Grist to my mill. In this reaction slot (16th Oct 2013) I launch my new metaphysical school - welcome to EXPLANATIONISM! Folk metaphysics, and the best philosophical metaphysics, is entirely driven by the needs of explanation.
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
     Full Idea: The four main concepts of a species are 'phenetic' (similarity of traits), 'biological species' (interbreeding and isolated), 'ecological niche' (occupying an adaptive zone), or 'phylogenetic-cladistic' (start and finish at splits in lineage)
     From: report of Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [my summary of Devitt's list] Devitt attacks the whole lot, in favour of essentialism - the species being fixed by its underlying explanatory mechanisms.