Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense' and 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

6253	Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions.
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3158	Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
	A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance

3159	Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
	A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism

4761	The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
	Full Idea: Mackie's 'error theory' of ethics says that if a fact is something that corresponds to a true proposition, there are actually no moral facts, hence no knowledge of what moral statements are about.
	From: report of J.L. Mackie (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [1977]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §4.2
	A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think that there are moral facts (about what nature shows us constitutes a good human being), based on virtue theory. Mackie is a good warning, though, against making excessive claims. You end up like a bad scientist.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

6256	Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses?
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV)
	A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check?

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness

6252	Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations.
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro)
	A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132).

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology

6257	You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain.
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV)
	A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule?

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality

6254	We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor?
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
	A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question.

6255	Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
	Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him?
	From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
	A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality.