15 ideas
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I hardly think myself that ethics ought to be included in the domain of philosophy. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch.22) | |
| A reaction: He declines to give his reasons. The implication of the chapter is that ethics is essentially a social and political matter, so that individual ethical guidelines are unimportant. Maybe the woolliness of ethics was also an impediment. |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A sentence like 'You ought to do so-and-so' primarily has an emotional content. It means ' this is the act towards which I feel the emotion of approval'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: I don't understand how I can say 'you ought to do p', and very clearly mean that the situation would be altogether better if p, only to be told by some philosopher that what I thought was a sensible judgement is actually an emotional outburst. |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If harmonious desires are what we should seek, love is better than hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve the object of his desire. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful example of cool philosophical objectivity! Of course it is not true, because the fact that two people love one another doesn't not prevent them from having some incompatible desires, as every couple knows. |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Forty years later, Russell's famous filmed message to posteriority said exactly this. In decision making, get the facts; in relationships, show love and tolerance. I find both parts inspiring. |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| Full Idea: During and immediately after the war [14-18], those who hated the Germans were happier than those who still regarded them as human beings, because they could feel that what was being done served a good purpose. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: A striking remark. There are lots of situations where hatred seems to increase happiness. Russell is roughly defending consequentialism. |
| 7844 | The Golden Rule is accepted everywhere, and gives a fixed target for morality [Voltaire] |
| Full Idea: Pascal asks where we can find a fixed point in morality. The answer is in that single maxim accepted by all nations: "Do not do to others what you would not like to have done to you". | |
| From: Francois-Marie Voltaire (Philosophical Letters from England [1733], 25) | |
| A reaction: Should I only offer to my guests foods which I myself like? If I don't mind a bit of pain, is it all right to inflict it? It is a sensible rule, but not precise enough for philosophy. |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Historically, virtue consisted at first of obedience to authority, whether that of the gods, the government, or custom. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Russell proceeds to demolish such a theory, which he finds it fairly easy to do. In Nietzsche's terms, he is only describing slave virtue. Each role in the world has its own virtues (and functions). Which gods are the most virtuous? |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The supreme moral rule should be: Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: Russell makes no reference to Kant, but this is obviously intended to rebut the more rationalist Kantian view of what is imperative. The use of 'harmonious' chimes in best with Plato's account of the soul in 'Republic'. |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| Full Idea: To force a man to curb his desires, as we do by the criminal law, is not nearly so satisfactory as to cause him genuinely to feel the desires which promote socially harmonious conduct. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree, but improving the desires of selfish and even vicious people is a rather challenging task. |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: Russell suggested, in defence of an empiricist theory of time-awareness, that a sense organ goes on vibrating, like a piano string, for while after the stimulation. Thus we can see the movement of a second hand, seen in several places at once. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Realism' | |
| A reaction: Hm. If they were vibrating the last experience, they couldn't pick up the new one. When something fast happens the brain resonates fortissimo! If your eyes are moving it will be different neurons that get fired at each instant. |