15 ideas
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
Full Idea: We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by use of some descriptive phrase, such as 'author of these works'. But once we have this reference fixed, we then use the name 'Cicero' rigidly to designate the man who in fact we have identified by his authorship. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.183) | |
A reaction: Even supposedly rigid names can shift reference, as Evans's example of 'Madagascar' shows (Idea 9041). Reference is a much more social activity than Kripke is willing to admit. There is a 'tradition' of reference (Dummett) for the name 'Cicero'. |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
Full Idea: The function of names is simply to refer. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.167) | |
A reaction: This is Kripke reverting to the John Stuart Mill view of names. If I say "you are a right Casanova" I don't simply refer to Casanova. In notorious examples like 'Homer' reference is fine, but the object of reference is a bit elusive. |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Although the statement that this table (if it exists at all) was not made of ice, is necessary, it certainly is not something that we know a priori. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.180) | |
A reaction: One of the key thoughts in modern philosophy. Kit Fine warns against treating it as a new and exciting toy, but it is a new and exciting toy. Scientific essentialism, which I so want to be true, is built on this proposal. |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
Full Idea: By 'rigid designator' I mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971]) | |
A reaction: I am persistently troubled by the case of objects which are slightly different in another possible world. Does 'Aristotle' refer to him as young or old? Might the very same man have had a mole on his cheek? |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It seems that we cannot say "Nixon might have been a different man from the man he in fact was", unless we mean it metaphorically. He might have been a different sort of person. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.176) | |
A reaction: The problem is that being a 'different sort of person' could become more and more drastic, till Nixon is unrecognisable. I don't see how I can stipulate that a small and dim mouse is Richard Nixon, even in a possible world with magicians. |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Statements about the modal properties of this table never refer to counterparts. However, if someone confuses the epistemological problems and the metaphysical problems he will be well on the way to the counterpart theory of Lewis. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.184 n16) | |
A reaction: I can't make out what we should say about a possible object which is very nearly this table. Kripke needs the table to have a clear and unwavering essence, but tables are not that sort of thing. How would Kripke define 'physical object'? |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 | |
A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory. |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
Full Idea: The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190) | |
A reaction: The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't. |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
Full Idea: 'Heat' is a rigid designator, which is picked out by the contingent property of being felt in a certain way; pain, on the other hand, is picked out by an essential (indeed necessary and sufficient) property. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190 n19) | |
A reaction: Hm. I could pick out your pain by your contingent whimpering behaviour. I can spot my own potential pain by a combination of bodily damage and pain killing tablets. I suspect him of the same blunder as Descartes on this one. |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |