Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'The Birth of Tragedy' and 'Papers of 1906'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
     Full Idea: For Nietzsche philosophy begins in horror - existence is something both horrible and absurd.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Birth of Tragedy [1871]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - How to Read Nietzsche Ch.1
     A reaction: A striking contrast to Aristotle (Idea 549). Personally I think my philosophy begins with confusion. Not that I endorse a Wittgenteinian view, that we are just trying to cure ourselves of self-inflicted wounds. Life is very complex and we are bit simple.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
     A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
     A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
     Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906'
     A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example.