13 ideas
| 472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8 |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
| 20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |
| Full Idea: The difference between analytic and synthetic judgements is an unimportant fluid one. 'Ice melts' is analytic if it is already taken up into the concept of ice, and synthetic if not yet taken up. It is just a different state of the formation of concepts. | |
| From: Friedrich Schleiermacher (Dialektik [1833], p.563), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 8 'Scientific' | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I wonder if Quine ever encountered this quotation. The idea refers to Kant's notion of analyticity, and makes the good point that predicates only become 'contained in the subject' once the situation is very familiar. |
| 1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b |
| 1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d |
| 473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a |
| 476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle. | |
| From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3 |