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All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Letters to Samuel Masson' and 'Prior Analytics'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22271 Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
     Full Idea: It was Aristotle who initiated the use of the letter of the (Greek) alphabet 'schematically', to stand for an unspecified piece of language of some appropriate grammatical type.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Aris'
     A reaction: Did he invent it from scratch, or borrow it from the mathematicians? Euclid labels diagrams with letters.
18909 Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle there are four formatives for sentences: 'belongs to some', 'belongs to every', 'belongs to no', and 'does not belong to every'. These are 'copulae'. Aristotle would have written 'wise belongs to some man'.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
     A reaction: A rather set-theoretic reading. This invites a Quinean scepticism about whether wisdom is some entity which can 'belong' to a person. It makes trope theory sound attractive, offering a unique wisdom that is integrated into that particular person.
8080 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle identified four 'figures' of argument, based on combinations of Subject (S) and Predicate (P) and Middle term (M). The addition of 'all' and 'some', and 'has' and 'has not' got the property, resulted in 256 possible syllogisms, 19 of them valid.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: [Compressed version of Devlin] What Aristotle did was astonishing, and must be one of the key ideas of western civilization, even though a lot of his assumptions have been revised or rejected.
13912 Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Aristotle replaced the Platonic noun-verb account of logical syntax with a 'copular' account. A sentence is a pair of terms bound together logically (not necessarily grammatically) by one of four 'logical copulae' (every, none, some, not some).
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C - Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics 8
     A reaction: So the four copulas are are-all, are-never, are-sometimes, and are-sometime-not. Consider 'men' and 'mortal'. Alternatively, Idea 18909.
8071 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle listed a total of nineteen syllogisms involved in logical reasoning, though some of the ones on his list were subsequently shown to be invalid.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], Ch.1) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes
     A reaction: It is quite upsetting to think that the founding genius got some of it wrong, but that just shows how subtle and complex the analysis of rational thought can be.
11060 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's logic is based on the triadic syllogism, the distinction between subject and one-place predicates, that universal claims have existential commitment, and bivalence, excluded middle and noncontradiction.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.2
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13819 Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's system accepted as correct some laws which nowadays we reject, for example |= (Some Fs are G) or (some Fs are not G). He failed to take into account the possibility of there being no Fs at all.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by David Bostock - Intermediate Logic 8.4
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9403 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35)
     A reaction: Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
11148 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24b18)
     A reaction: Notice that it is modal ('suppose', rather than 'know'), that necessity is involved, which is presumably metaphysical necessity, and that there are assumptions about what would be true, and not just what follows from what.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
     Full Idea: Aristotle often preferred to formulate predications by placing the terms at opposite ends of the sentence and joining them by predicating expressions like 'belongs-to-some' or 'belongs-to-every'.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Conceptions'
     A reaction: This is Sommers's picture of Aristotle, which led Sommers to develop his modern Term Logic.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
3300 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Basic to Aristotle's logic is the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate, which he glosses in terms of the contrast between a substance and its properties.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro
     A reaction: The introduction of quantifiers and 'logical form' can't disguise the fact that we still talk about (and with) objects and predicates, because no one can think of any other way to talk.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11149 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate. Belonging 'to every/to none' is universal; belonging 'to some/not to some/not to every' is particular; belonging or not belonging (without universal/particular) is indeterminate.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24a16)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
8079 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
13190 I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus, I do not admit any real infinite numbers, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number. ..I consider infinitesimal quantities to be useful fictions.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Masson [1716], 1716)
     A reaction: With the phrase 'useful fictions' we seem to have jumped straight into Harty Field. I'm with Leibniz on this one. The history of mathematics is a series of ingenious inventions, whenever they seem to make further exciting proofs possible.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14641 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It sometimes results that the deduction becomes necessary when only one of the premises is necessary (not whatever premise it might be, however, but only the premise in relation to the major extreme [premise]).
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 30a15)
     A reaction: The qualification is brackets is said by Plantinga (1969) to be a recognition of the de re/ de dicto distinction (later taken up by Aquinas). Plantinga gives two examples to illustrate his reading.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18911 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
     Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the terms of a language form a finite hierarchy, where the higher terms are predicable of more things than are lower terms.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
     A reaction: I would be a bit cautious about placing something precisely in a hierarchy according to how many things it can be predicated of. It is a start, though, in trying to give a decent account of generality, which is a major concept in philosophy.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
     Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
     A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.