|
8210
|
Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
|
|
Full Idea:
To 'deconstruct' philosophy would be to think the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time determine what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into history by this motivated repression.
|
|
From:
Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.5)
|
|
A reaction:
All of this type of philosophy is motivated by what I think of as (I'm afraid!) a rather adolescent belief that we are all being 'repressed', and that somehow, if we think hard enough, we can all become 'free', and then everything will be fine.
|
|
8211
|
The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
|
|
Full Idea:
The movement of 'différance', as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture etc.
|
|
From:
Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.7)
|
|
A reaction:
'Différance' is a word coined by Derrida, and his most famous concept. At first glance, the concept of a thing which is the source of all differentiation sounds like a fiction.
|
|
13190
|
I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
Notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus, I do not admit any real infinite numbers, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number. ..I consider infinitesimal quantities to be useful fictions.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Masson [1716], 1716)
|
|
A reaction:
With the phrase 'useful fictions' we seem to have jumped straight into Harty Field. I'm with Leibniz on this one. The history of mathematics is a series of ingenious inventions, whenever they seem to make further exciting proofs possible.
|
|
7657
|
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
|
|
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
|
|
A reaction:
[Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
|
|
7656
|
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
|
|
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
|
|
A reaction:
I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
|