4 ideas
9916 | Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality | |
A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied. |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If vagueness is semantic indeterminacy, then wherever we have vague statements, we have several alternative precisifications of the vague language involved, all with equal claims of being 'intended'. | |
From: David Lewis (Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood [1988], p.318) |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |