15456
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Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied).
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From:
report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II
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A reaction:
The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic!
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23224
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That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley]
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Full Idea:
[Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own.
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From:
Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
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A reaction:
Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails.
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7657
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Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
[Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
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7656
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I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
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