4 ideas
| 3299 | In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie] |
| Full Idea: In logic identity is an equivalence relation, which involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x), and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z). | |
| From: James Baillie (Problems in Personal Identity [1993], Intr p.4) |
| 16719 | The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley] |
| Full Idea: Secondary qualities are caused by a mixture of primary qualities. | |
| From: Walter Burley (De formis [1330], pars post p.65), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2 | |
| A reaction: Like paint. He probably has in mind hot, cold, wet and dry as the primary qualities. |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
| A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
| A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |