6 ideas
8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13) | |
A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other. |
8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8) | |
A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals. |
8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12) | |
A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics! |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |
21132 | Domination is probable obedience by some group of persons [Weber] |
Full Idea: Domination is the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons. | |
From: Max Weber (Economy and Society [1919], p.53), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
A reaction: Said to be an 'influential definition'. In principle you might have no domination, but be regularly obeyed because your commands were so acceptable to a very independent-minded group of people. That said, good definition! |