'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
Full Idea:
Any set with a concrete member is 'impure'. 'Pure' sets are those that are not impure, and are paradigm cases of abstract entities, such as the sort of sets apparently dealt with in Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.116)
A reaction:
[I am unclear whether Jubien is introducing this distinction] This seems crucial in accounts of mathematics. On the one had arithmetic can be built from Millian pebbles, giving impure sets, while logicists build it from pure sets.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Logical form should not have the last word in metaphysics, since it might predicate a property that we have theoretical reason to reject.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
A reaction:
These kind of warnings need to be sounded all the time, to prevent logicians and language experts from pitching their tents in the middle of metaphysics. They are welcome guests only,
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
Full Idea:
A first-order model can be viewed as a kind of ordered set, and if the domain of the model contains only concrete entities then it is a 'fundamental' model.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.117)
A reaction:
An important idea. Fundamental models are where the world of logic connects with the physical world. Any account of relationship between fundamental models and more abstract ones tells us how thought links to world.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
Full Idea:
It makes no sense to suppose there might be just one natural number, say seventeen.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.113)
A reaction:
Hm. Not convinced. If numbers are essentially patterns, we might only have the number 'twelve', because we had built our religion around anything which exhibited that form (in any of its various arrangements). Nice point, though.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
Full Idea:
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure per se.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.115)
A reaction:
This is the Structuralist idea beginning to take shape after Benacerraf's launching of it. Note that Jubien gets there by his rejection of platonism, whereas some structuralist have given a platonist interpretation of structure.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
Full Idea:
If the intuition of mathematical objects were general, there would be no real debate over platonism.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.111)
A reaction:
It is particularly perplexing when Gödel says that his perception of them is just like sight or smell, since I have no such perception. How do you individuate very large numbers, or irrational numbers, apart from writing down numerals?
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
Full Idea:
I am unable to see how the mere existence of pure abstract entities enables us to concoct appropriate models to serve as interpretations.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.111)
A reaction:
Nice question. It is always assumed that once we have platonic realm, that everything else follows. Even if we are able to grasp the objects, despite their causal inertness, we still have to discern innumerable relations between them.
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
Full Idea:
The essential properties of mathematical entities seem to be relational, ...so we make no progress unless we can pick out some mathematical entities wihout presupposing other entities already picked out.
From:
Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.112)
A reaction:
[compressed] Jubien is a good critic of platonism. He has identified the problem with Frege's metaphor of a 'borehole', where we discover delightful new properties of numbers simply by reaching them.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Full Idea:
It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
A reaction:
[he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
Full Idea:
If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
A reaction:
This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
Full Idea:
All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
A reaction:
Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
Full Idea:
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
A reaction:
[Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
Full Idea:
I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
A reaction:
I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
Full Idea:
Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
A reaction:
I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The questions about causation concern their relata (in space-time, how fine-grained, how many?) and the metaphysics (distinguish causal sequences from others, the direction of causation, selecting causes among pre-conditions?).
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], Intro)
A reaction:
A very nice map (which has got me thinking about restructuring this database). I can't think of a better way to do philosophy than this (let's hear it for analysis - but the greatest role models for the approach are Aristotle and Aquinas).
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
It is not clear whether causation is transitive. For example, if a boulder roll's towards a hiker's head, causing the hiker to duck, which causes the hiker to survive, it does not seem that the rolling boulder causes the survival of the hiker.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
A reaction:
Maybe survival is not an event or an effect. How many times have I survived in my life? We could, though, say that the hiker strained a muscle as he or she ducked. But then it is unclear whether the boulder caused the muscle-strain.
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Theories of causal connection are: nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, agential manipulability, contiguous change, energy flow, physical processes, property transference, primitivism and eliminativism.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
A reaction:
Schaffer reduces these to probability and process. I prefer the latter. The first two are wrong, the third right but superficial, the fourth wrong, the fifth, sixth and seventh on the right lines, the eighth wrong, the ninth tempting, and the last wrong.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The main argument for causation being transcendent (rather than being immanent in nature) is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Thus a rock-climber is caused to survive by not falling.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
A reaction:
I don't like that. The obvious strategy is to redescribe the events. Even being hit with a brick could be described as an 'absence of brick-prevention'. So not being hit by a brick can be described as 'presence of brick prevention'.
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
One problem case for the process view of causation is 'disconnection'. If a brick breaks a window by being fired from a catapult, a latch is released which was preventing the catapult from firing, so the 'process' is just internal to the catapult.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
A reaction:
Schaffer says the normal reply is to deny that the catch-releasing is genuinely causal. I would have thought we should go more fine-grained, and identify linked components of the causal process.
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
A problem case for the process view of causation is 'misconnection'. A process may be connected to an effect, without being causal, as when someone watches an act of vandalism in dismay.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
A reaction:
This is a better objection to the process view than Idea 10377. If I push a window with increasing force until it breaks, the process is continuous, but it suddenly becomes a cause.
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
It might be that if causation is said to be a process, then a process is nothing more than a causal sequence, so that causation is primitive.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
This again is tempting (as well as the primitivist view of probabilistic causation). If one tries to define a process as mere chronology, then the causal and accidental are indistinguishable. I take the label 'primitive' to be just our failure.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The traditional view that the direction of causation is the direction of time has been challenged, by the direction of forking, by overdetermination, by independence, and by manipulation, which all seem to be one-directional features.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
A reaction:
Personally I incline to the view that time is prior, and fixes the direction of causation. I'm not sure that 'backward causation' can be stated coherently, even if it is metaphysically or naturally possible.
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Reasons for causal order being temporal order are that otherwise the effect might occur but the cause then get prevented, ..and that they must be the same, because the temporal order can only be analysed in terms of the causal order.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
A reaction:
If one took both time and causation as primitive, then the second argument would be void. The first argument, though, sounds pretty overwhelming to me.
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
A reaction:
The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Primitivism arises from our failure to reduce causation, but also from causation being too central to reduce. The probability and process accounts are said to be inevitably circular, as they cannot be understood without reference to causation.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
This is very tempting. The primitive view, though, must deal with the direction problem, which may suggest that time is even more primitive. Can we have a hierarchy of primitiveness? To be alive is to be causal.
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The three main objections to causation being primitive are that causation can't be anything more than what we observe, or that such a primitive is too spooky to be acceptable, or that primitivism leads to elimination of causation.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
[summarised] I don't like the first (Humean) view. I suspect that anything which we finally decide has to be primitive (time, for example) is going to be left looking 'spooky', and I suspect that eliminativism is just Humeanism in disguise.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The concepts of 'event', 'law', 'cause' and 'explanation' are nomic concepts which serve to allow a systematic understanding of science; they do not themselves appear in the equations.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
This is a criticism of Russell's attempt to eliminate causation from science. It shows that there has to be something we can call 'metascience', which is the province of philosophers, since scientists don't have much interest in it.
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Causation can't be eliminated if it is needed to explain persistence, explanation, disposition, perception, warrant, action, responsibility, mental functional role, conceptual content, and reference. It's elimination would be catastrophic.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
[compressed list] I think I am going to vote for the view that causation is one of the primitives in the metaphysics of nature, so I have to agree with this. Most of the listed items, though, are controversial, so eliminativists are not defeated.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Causation seems to be primitive if the same laws and patterns of events might embody three different possible causes, as when two magicians cast the same successful spell, each with a 50% chance of success, and who was successful is unclear.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
I'm cautious when the examples involve magic. It implies that the process that leads to the result will be impossible to observe, but if magic never really happens, then the patterns of events will always be different.
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The view that causation is primitive can be defended against Humean critics by saying that causation can be directly observed in the will or our bodies, or that it can be inferred as the best explanation.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
I like both views, and have just converted myself to the primitivist view of causation! I can't know the essence of a tree, because I am not a tree, but I can know the essence of causation. The Greek fascination with explaining movement is linked.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Full Idea:
Events are relatively coarse-grained, unlike facts; so the event of John's saying 'hello' seems to be the same event as John's saying 'hello' loudly, while they seem to be different facts.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
A reaction:
The example seems good support for facts, since saying 'hello' loudly could have quite different effects from just saying 'hello'. I also incline temperamentally towards a fine-grained account, because it is more reductivist.
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
A reaction:
An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The view that there are two causal relata is widely assumed but seldom defended. But the account based on 'effectual difference' says the form is 'c causes e rather than e*'. One might defend four relata, in 'c rather than c* causes e rather than e*'.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
A reaction:
[compressed] This doesn't sound very plausible to me. How do you decide which is e*? If I lob a brick into the crowd, it hits Jim rather than - who?
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
A reaction:
Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The primitivist about causation might say that the notion of an event (or other relata) cannot be understood without reference to causation, because properties themselves are individuated by their causal role.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
Having enthusiastically embraced the causal view of properties (see Shoemaker and Ellis), I suddenly realise that I seem required to embrace primitivism about causation, which I hadn't anticipated! I've no immediate problem with that.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
A reaction:
The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause.
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
Another argument against the view that there is no basis for selecting 'the' cause is that we have no concept of causation without such a selection.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
A reaction:
Good. Otherwise we could only state the conditions preceding an event, and then every event that occurred at any given moment in a region would have the same cause. How can 'the' cause be necessary, and yet capricious?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
If Pam threw the brick that broke the window, then Bob (who refrained) might be a more reliable vandal, so that Pam's throw might have made the shattering less likely, so probability-raising is not necessary for causation.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1)
A reaction:
That objection looks pretty conclusive to me. I take the probabilistic view to be a non-starter.
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
Full Idea:
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive: nomological - to distinguish laws from generalizations; statistical - to decide background; counterfactual - decide background; agent intervention - to understand intervention.
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
A reaction:
I don't need much convincing that the probabilistic view is wrong. To just accept causation as primitive seems an awful defeat for philosophy. We should be able to characterise it, even if we cannot know its essence.