14 ideas
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Donnellan objects that Russell's theory of definite descriptions overlooks the referential use (Russell writes as if all descriptions are used attributively), and that Strawson assumes they are all used referentially, to draw attention to things. | |
| From: report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This seems like a nice little success for analytical philosophy - clarifying a horrible mess by making a simple distinction that leaves everyone happy. |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: A definite description may also be used non-referentially, even as it occurs in one and the same sentence. | |
| From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §I) | |
| A reaction: Donnellan says we have to know about the particular occasion on which the description is used, as in itself it will not achieve reference. "Will the last person out switch off the lights" achieves its reference at the end of each day. |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: A speaker who uses a definite description 'attributively' in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so; a speaker who uses it 'referentially' enables his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about. | |
| From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §III) | |
| A reaction: "Smith's murderer is insane" exemplifies the first use before he is caught, and the second use afterwards. The gist is that reference is not a purely linguistic activity, but is closer to pointing at something. This seems right. |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: For Russell there is a logical entailment: 'the x is F' entails 'there exists one and only one x'. Whether or not this is true of the attributive use of definite descriptions, it does not seem true of the referential use. The existence is a presumption. | |
| From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §VI) | |
| A reaction: Can we say 'x does not exist, but x is F'? Strictly, that sounds to me more like a contradiction than a surprising rejection of a presumption. However, 'Father Xmas does not exist, but he has a red coat'. |
| 16640 | Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N] |
| Full Idea: Form is the state and condition of a thing, a result of the connection among its material principles; it is a constituting principle, not an operative one. | |
| From: Nicholas Hill (Philosophia Epicurea [1610], n 35) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau presents this as a denial of form, but it looks to me like someone fishing for what form could be in a more scientific context. Aristotle would have approved of 'principles'. Hill seems to defend the categorical against the dispositional. |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Donnellan argued that we could recognize a referential use of a definite description 'the F' by the fact that the speaker could thereby refer to something which is not F. | |
| From: report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
| A reaction: If the expression employed achieved reference whether the speaker wanted it to or not, it would certainly look as if the expression was inherently referring. |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: Donnellan seems to be unsure whether to regard his referential-attributive distinction as indicating a semantic ambiguity or merely a pragmatic one. | |
| From: comment on Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1 | |
| A reaction: I vote for pragmatic. In a single brief conversation a definite description could start as attributive and end as referential, but it seems unlikely that its semantics changed in mid-paragraph. |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: If I think the king is a usurper, "Is the king in his counting house?" succeeds in referring to the right man, even though I do not believe that he fits the description. | |
| From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §IV) | |
| A reaction: This seems undeniable. If I point at someone, I can refer successfully with almost any description. "Oy! Adolf! Get me a drink!" Reference is an essential aspect of language, and it is not entirely linguistic. |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| Full Idea: Whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attributively is a function of the speaker's intentions in a particular case. | |
| From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §VII) | |
| A reaction: Donnellan's distinction, and his claim here, seem to me right. However words on a notice could refer on one occasion, and just describe on another. "Anyone entering this cage is mad". |