11 ideas
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Axiomatising set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatisation. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.296) |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows: If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.293) |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
Full Idea: The initial foundations should be immediately clear, natural and not open to question. This is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inference, by it is not satisfied by the axioms of Zermelo, or anything else of that kind. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.299) | |
A reaction: This is a plea (endorsed by Almog) that the integers themselves should be taken as primitive and foundational. I would say that the idea of successor is more primitive than the integers. |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations, and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.300) |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
Full Idea: General statements are not valid in the study of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 17) | |
A reaction: This is his striking obsession with the particularity and fine detail of nature. Alexander von Humbolt was exploring nature in S.America in this year. It sounds wrong about physics, but possibly right about biology. |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
Full Idea: In the formation of thoughts all parts of the body seem to me to be working together. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 20) | |
A reaction: I can only think that Spinoza must be behind this thought, or La Mettrie. It seems a strikingly unusual intuition for its time, when almost everyone takes a spiritual sort of dualism for granted. |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
Full Idea: What is it that shapes a person if not his life history? And in the same way a splendid person is shaped by nothing other than world history. Many people live better in the past and in the future than in the present. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 15) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is a lot to be said for splendid people who live entirely in the present (such as jazz musicians). Some people do have an awesomely wide historical perspective on their immediate lives. Palaeontology is not the master discipline though! |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Nature is a whole - in which each part in itself can never be wholly understood. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 18) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem right when studying some item in a laboratory, but it seems undeniable when you consider the history and future of each item. |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Musical relations seem to me to be actually the basic relations of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 10) | |
A reaction: Novalis shows no signs of being a pythagorean, and then suddenly comes out with this. I suppose if you love music, this thought should float into your mind at regular intervals, because the power of music is so strong. Does he mean ratios? |