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8972
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What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen]
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Full Idea:
Nothing in the world of nominalistically acceptable things could ground or explain the non-identity of the set {A,{A,B}} with the set {B,{A,B}}.
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From:
Peter van Inwagen (Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions [2003], p.154)
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A reaction:
[He cites Goodman for this thought] Van Inwagen is offering this to show that the existence of sets is abstract, whereas Goodman was denying the existence of sets altogether. I'm with Goodman. Nice example.
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3159
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Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
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A reaction:
If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.
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20991
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People prepare our dinner from their own self-interest, not from humanity [Smith,A]
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Full Idea:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love.
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From:
Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations [1776], p.26-7), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 08 'Narrowing'
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A reaction:
Sen passionately pleads that this not be taken out of context. It is about the motivation for the relationship of exchange, and not about morality in general, which also includes trust etc. The subsequent lines in Smith show this.
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