Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Syntagma' and 'There are no ordinary things'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

9052	Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
	Full Idea: In a slogan, Unger's thesis is that all vague predicates lack application ('nihilism', says Williamson). Classical logic can be retained in its entirety. There are no borderline cases: for vague F, everything is not F; nothing is either F or borderline F.
	From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1
	A reaction: Vague F could be translated as 'I'm quite tempted to apply F', in which case Unger is right. This would go with Russell's view. Logic and reason need precise concepts. The only strategy with vagueness is to reason hypothetically.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

16730	If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

16070	There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
	Full Idea: Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships.
	From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4
	A reaction: The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

16619	We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7658	Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
	Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
	A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self

7655	The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
	Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7657	Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
	Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

7656	I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
	Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence

7654	What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
	A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism

16593	Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
	A reaction: If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.

16729	How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.