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All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Principles of Philosophy' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy

3656	The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The greatest good which can exist in a state is to have true philosophers.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
	A reaction: …because they understand true reality, especially the Good.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

16744	All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
	Full Idea: There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

5016	Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
	A reaction: Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

5015	A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Universals arise solely from the fact that we avail ourselves of one idea in order to think of all individual things that have a certain similitude. When we understand under the same name all the objects represented by this idea, that name is universal.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
	A reaction: Judging by the boldness of the pronouncement, it looks as if Descartes hasn't recognised the complexity of the problem. How do we spot a 'similarity', especially an abstraction like 'tool' or 'useful'? This sounds like Descartes trying to avoid Platonism.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

16630	If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Based on perceiving the presence of some attribute, we conclude there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it can be attributed.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.52), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.1
	A reaction: A rainbow might be a tricky case. This illustrates the persistent belief in substances, even among philosophers who embraced the new corpuscular and mechanistic view of matter.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

5013	A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
	Full Idea: By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.51)
	A reaction: Properties, of course, are the things which have dependent existence. Can properties be reduced to substances (e.g. by adopting a materialist theory of mind)? Note that Descartes does not think that substances depend on God for existence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

16633	A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
	A reaction: Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito

3658	Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
	Full Idea: He who decides to doubt everything cannot nevertheless doubt that he exists while he doubts.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)

5005	I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
	Full Idea: There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07)
	A reaction: The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive.

5006	'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
	Full Idea: By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09)
	A reaction: There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

5012	'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49)
	A reaction: There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

5004	We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
	Full Idea: It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
	A reaction: A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness

5014	We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
	Full Idea: We can understand thinking without imagination or sensation, as is quite clear to anyone who attends to the matter.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53)
	A reaction: We may certainly take it that Descartes means if it is understandable then it is logically possible. To believe that thinking could occur without imagination strikes me as an astonishing error. I take imagination to be more central than understanding.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7658	Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
	Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
	A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking

5017	In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Because each one of us understands what he thinks, and that in thinking he can shut himself off from every other substance, we may conclude that each of us is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from corporeal substance.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
	A reaction: This seems to be a novel argument which requires elucidation. I can 'shut myself off from every other substance'? If I shut myself off from thinking about food, does that mean hunger is not part of me? Or convince yourself that you don't have a brother?

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self

7655	The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
	Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will

5010	Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
	Full Idea: It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most common notions found innately in us.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.39)
	A reaction: It seems to me plausible to say that we have an innate conception of our own will (our ability to make decisions), though Hume says we only learn about the will from experience, but the idea that it is absolutely 'free' might never cross our minds.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will

23681	The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
	Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8)
	A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will

23676	A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
	Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1)
	A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will

23680	We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
	Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
	A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism

5011	There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
	Full Idea: I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48)
	A reaction: This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality.

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind

5018	Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
	A reaction: If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7657	Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
	Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

7656	I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
	Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error

5007	Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
	Full Idea: What usually misleads us is that we very frequently form a judgement although we do not have an accurate perception of what we judge.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.33)
	A reaction: This seems to me a generally accurate observation, particularly in the making of moral judgements (which was probably not what Descartes was considering). The implication is that judgements are to a large extent forced by our perceptions.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence

7654	What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
	Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
	From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
	A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

23678	A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
	Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4)
	A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions

5009	We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
	Full Idea: We do not praise automata, although they respond exactly to the movements they were designed to produce, since their actions are performed necessarily
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
	A reaction: I say we attribute responsibility when we perceive something like a 'person' as causing them. We don't blame small animals, because there is 'no one at home', but we blame children as they develop a full character and identity. We can ignore free will.

5008	The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
	Full Idea: That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature

15987	Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
	Full Idea: I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
	A reaction: This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied

12730	We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
	Full Idea: We will not seek for the reason of natural things from the end which God or nature has set before him in their creation .
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], §28)
	A reaction: Teleology is more relevant to biology than to the other sciences, and it is hard to understand an eye without a notion of 'what it is for'. Planetary motion reveals nothing about purposes. If you demand a purpose, it becomes more baffling.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension

16601	Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction

23677	We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
	Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2)
	A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

23679	The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
	Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
	A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour.