8 ideas
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is by the natural light that the axioms of mathematics are recognised. If we take away the same quantity from two equal things, …a thing we can easily predict without having experienced it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], p.189) | |
A reaction: He also says two equal weights will keep a balance level. Plato thinks his slave boy understands halving an area by the natural light, but that is just as likely to be experience. It is too easy to attribut thoughts to a 'natural light'. |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That which is necessary for something does not constitute its essence. Air is necessary for our life, but our life is something other than air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Why can't modern philosophers hang on to this distinction? They seem to think that because they don't believe in traditional essences they can purloin the word for something else. Same with the word 'abstraction'. |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence outside us of sensible and material things. ....It is generally true that we only know necessary truths by the natural light [of reason] | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: A nice quotation summarising a view for which Leibniz is famous - that there is a tight correlation between necessary truths and our a priori knowledge of them. The obvious challenge comes from Kripke's claim that scientists can discover necessities. |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We use the external senses ...to make us know their particular objects ...but they do not make us know what those sensible qualities are ...whether red is small revolving globules causing light, heat a whirling of dust, or sound is waves in air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: These seems to be exactly the concept of secondary qualities which Locke was promoting. They are unreliable information about the objects we perceive. Primary qualities are reliable information. I like that distinction. |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does. |
4921 | Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose] |
Full Idea: I propose that microtubules in nerve cells could give rise to a stable quantum state that would bind the activity of brain cells throughout the cerebrum and in doing so give rise to consciousness. | |
From: Roger Penrose (Could a computer ever understand? [1998], p.329) | |
A reaction: This seems to offer a physical theory to account for the 'unity' of the mind (which so impressed Descartes), but I don't quite see why being aware of things would ensue from some 'quantum binding'. I daresay 'quantum binding' occurs in the Sun. |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |