Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'On the Happy Life' and 'Real Natures and Familiar Objects'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
     Full Idea: I do not call any man wise who is subservient to anything.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §11)
     A reaction: At the very least, a wise man should be subservient to a wiser man.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
     Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4)
     A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
     Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
     Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
     Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2)
     A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea.
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
     Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
     Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
     A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The highest good is harmony of spirit.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §08)
     A reaction: This idea is straight from Plato's Republic.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
     Full Idea: You ask what I seek from virtue? Virtue herself. For she has nothing better, she is herself her own reward.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §09)
     A reaction: Presumably this is the source of the popular saying that 'virtue is its own reward'. The trouble is that this doesn't seem a very persuasive thing to say to a sceptic who doubts whether being virtuous is worth the trouble.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
     Full Idea: In the case of virtue excess should not be feared, since in virtue resides moderation.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §13)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that all of the virtues are unified in the one achievement of the virtuous state. It leaves the notion of 'virtue' a bit thin in content, though.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why, to your shame, are you so careless that you do not know your handful of slaves by sight?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What doubt can there be that the wise man has greater scope for displaying his powers if he is rich than if he is poor, since in the case of poverty only one kind of virtue exists - refusal to be bowed down and crushed.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §22)
     A reaction: It is against this view that I see Jesus proposing poverty as central to virtue. But then he has the surprising view (to Seneca) that humility is a virtue. What Nietzsche calls the slaves' inversion of values.
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Wealth is not a good; for it it was, it would make men good.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §24)
     A reaction: An immediately attractive argument, but should we assume that anything which is good will enhance our personal goodness? If goodness is a habit, then continual pursuit of wealth is the test case to examine. Seneca is right!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Human concerns are not so happily arranged that the majority favours the better things.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §02)
     A reaction: On the whole Seneca is unimpressed by democracy, as people are rushed into decisions by the crowd, and live to regret them.