10 ideas
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too. |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure. |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes. |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'. |
| 9145 | We form the image of a cardinal number by a double abstraction, from the elements and from their order [Cantor] |
| Full Idea: We call 'cardinal number' the general concept which, by means of our active faculty of thought, arises when we make abstraction from an aggregate of its various elements, and of their order. From this double abstraction the number is an image in our mind. | |
| From: George Cantor (Beitrage [1915], §1), quoted by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence Intro | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is the great Cantor, creator of set theory, endorsing the traditional abstractionism which Frege and his followers so despise. Fine offers a defence of it. The Frege view is platonist, because it refuses to connect numbers to the world. |
| 13554 | True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: There is no more reliable proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can happen to make you disturbed. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §06) | |
| A reaction: He specifically opposes Aristotle's view that there are times when anger is appropriate, and failure to be very angry indeed is a failure of character. |
| 13556 | Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: When the lamp has been removed from my sight, and my wife, no stranger now to my habit, has fallen silent, I examine the whole of my day and retrace my actions and words; I hide nothing from myself. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §36) |
| 13552 | Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Other vices drive the mind on, anger hurls it headlong; ..other vices revolt from good sense, this one from sanity; ...other vices seize individuals, this is the one passion that sometimes takes hold of an entire state. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §01) | |
| A reaction: He particularly dislikes anger because it is the vice that leads to violence. |
| 13553 | Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Other vile passions affect only the worst sort of men, but anger creeps up even on enlightened me who are otherwise sane. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §04) | |
| A reaction: A very interesting observation for anyone who is trying to analyse the key issues in virtue theory. |