3159
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Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
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Full Idea:
Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
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From:
Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
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A reaction:
If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.
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4800
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Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos]
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Full Idea:
Cohen contends that statements that express laws of nature are the products of eliminative induction, where accidentally true generalisations are the products of enumerative induction.
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From:
report of L. Jonathan Cohen (The Problem of Natural Laws [1980], p.222) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §7.1
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A reaction:
The idea is that enumerative induction only offers the support of positive instances, where eliminative induction involves attempts to falsify a range of hypotheses. This still bases laws on observed regularities, rather than essences or mechanisms.
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