29 ideas
8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
Full Idea: To seek wisdom rather than truth. It is more within our grasp. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797) | |
A reaction: A nice challenge to the traditional goal of philosophy. The idea that we should 'seek truth' only seems to have emerged during the Reformation. The Greeks may well never have dreamed of such a thing. |
8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
Full Idea: Everything we think must be thought with our entire being, body and soul. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1798) | |
A reaction: Not just that thinking must be a whole-hearted activity, but that the very contents of our thinking will be better if it arises out of being a physical creature, and not just a disembodied reasoner. Maybe the bowels are not needed to analyse set theory. |
8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
Full Idea: What stops or holds us back in metaphysics is a love of certainty. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1814) | |
A reaction: This is a prominent truth from the age of Descartes, but may have diminished in the twenty-first century. The very best metaphysicians (e.g. Aristotle and Lewis) always end in a trail of dots when things become unsure. |
8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
Full Idea: There are truths that instruct, perhaps, but they do not illuminate. In this class are all the truths of reasoning. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: A rather romantic view, which strikes me as false. An inspiring truth can suddenly collapse when you see why it must be false. Equally a line of reasoning can lead to a truth which need becomes an illumination. |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
Full Idea: Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: Presumably sceptics about the existence of objective truth must also be sceptical about the possibility of such a God. I think Joubert is close to the nature of truth here. It is a remote and barely imaginable ideal. |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
Full Idea: To know: it is to see inside oneself. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: Extreme internalism about justification! Personally I am becoming convinced that 'know' (unlike 'believe' and 'true') is an entirely social concept. Fools spend a lot of time instrospecting; wise people ask around, and check in books. |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Dennett identifies a hierarchy of minds running from 'Darwinian' (hard-wired solutions to problems), to 'Skinnerian' (trial-and-error), to 'Popperian' (anticipating possible experience), to 'Gregorian' (self-conscious representation, probably linguistic). | |
From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Interesting. The concept of an experiment seems a major step (assessing reality against an internal map), and the ability to think about one's own thoughts certainly strikes me as the mark of a top level mind. Maybe that is the importance of language. |
2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Nagel argues (because of brain bisection experiments) that we should jettison our commonsense assumption that the unity of consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair. | |
From: report of Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971]) by Michael Lockwood - Mind, Brain and the Quantum p.84 | |
A reaction: It seems wrong to call it 'commonsense'. It is an assumption that precedes any judgement, but if you rapidly grasp that your mind is in your brain, it becomes common sense that you can cut lumps out of your mind. |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
Full Idea: 'Sentience' comes in every imaginable grade or intensity, from the simplest and most 'robotic', to the most exquisitely sensitive, hyper-reactive 'human'. We have to draw a line for moral policy, but it is unlikely we will ever discover a threshold. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the only plausible view, if you take the theory of evolution seriously. We can even observe low-grade marginal sentience in our own minds, and then shoot up the scale when we focus our minds properly on an object. |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: What is it like to notice, while sound asleep, that your left arm has become twisted into a position in which it is putting undue strain on your left shoulder? Like nothing. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A nice question, and all part of Dennett's accurate campaign to show that consciousness is not an all-or-nothing thing. As when we are barely aware of driving, innumerable things happen in the shadowy corners of thought. |
8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
Full Idea: The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797) | |
A reaction: As a fan of the imagination, I love this one. I suspect that imagination, which was marginalised by Descartes, is actually the single most important aspect of thought (in slugs as well as humans). Abstraction requires imagination. |
3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
Full Idea: As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality. |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
Full Idea: An important step towards becoming a person is the step up from a first-order intentional system to a second-order system (which has beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires). | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Call it 'meta-thought'. I agree. Dennett thinks language is crucial to this, but the hallmark of intelligence and full-blown personhood is meta- and meta-meta-thought. Maybe the development of irony is a step up the evolutionary scale. Sarcasm is GOOD. |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
Full Idea: We are descended from robots, and composed of robots, and all the intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of billions of crude intentional systems. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A more grand view of intentionality (such as Searle's) seems more attractive than this, but the crucial fact about Dennett is that he takes the implications of evolution much more seriously than other philosophers. He's probably right. |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
Full Idea: There is no more fear or anger in adrenaline than there is silliness in a bottle of whiskey. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Not exactly an argument, but a nice rhetorical point against absurd claims about identity and reduction and elimination. We may say that there is no fear without adrenaline, and no adrenaline in a live brain without fear. |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Perhaps there is a minimum speed for a mind, rather like the minimum escape velocity required to overcome gravity and leave the planet. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett rejects this speculation, but he didn't stop to imagine what it would be LIKE if your brain slowed down, and he never considers Edelman's view that mind is a process. Put the two together… |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I think there are only two good reasons why, when you make a mind, the materials matter: speed, and the ubiquity of transducers and effectors throughout the nervous system. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This sounds roughly right, because it gives you something between multiple realisability (minds made of cans and string), and type-type identity (minds ARE a particular material). Call it 'biological functionalism'? |
8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
Full Idea: A thought is a thing as real as a cannon ball. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801) | |
A reaction: Nice. The realisation of a thought can strike someone as if they have been assaulted, and hearing some remarks can be as bad as being stabbed. That is quite apart from political consequences. Joubert is good on the physicality of thinking. |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The ancestor and chief rival of the language-of-thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas - that thoughts are about what they are about because they resemble their objects. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: When you place them side by side, neither seems quite right. How can a mental state resemble an object, and how can an inner language inherently capture the features of an object? Maybe we lack the words for the correct theory. |
8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
Full Idea: The idea of the nest in the bird's mind, where does it come from? | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: I think this is a very striking example in support of innate ideas. Most animal behaviour can be explained as responses to stimuli, but the bird seems to hold a model in its mind while it collects its materials. |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
Full Idea: A dog cannot consider its concepts. Concepts are not things in a dog's world in the way that cats are. Concepts are things in our world, because we have language. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Dogs must have concepts, though, or much of their behaviour (like desperation to go for a walk, or to eat) is baffling. This is as good a proposal as I have ever encountered for the value of language. Meta-thought is a huge evolutionary advantage. |
8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
Full Idea: He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1799) | |
A reaction: A rather crucial distinction in the world of hedonism. There seems something sincere about someone who pursues pleasure body and soul, and something fractured about the pursuit of pleasure without real commitment. The split seems possible. |
8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
Full Idea: What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1802) | |
A reaction: A lovely test question for aspiring young hedonists! It doesn't follow at all that we will despise past pleasures. The judgement may be utilitarian - that we regret the pleasures that harmed others, but love the harmless ones. Shame is social. |
8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
Full Idea: It would be difficult to be scorned and to live virtuously. We have need of support. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: He seems to have hit on what I take to be one of the keys to Aristotle: that virtue is a social matter, requiring both upbringing and a healthy culture. But we can help to create that culture, as well as benefiting from it. |
8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
Full Idea: In raising a child we must think of his old age. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1809) | |
A reaction: Very nice, and Aristotle would approve. If educators think much about the future, it rarely extends before the child's first job. We should be preparing good grand-parents, as well as parents and employees. Educate for retirement! |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
Full Idea: If a fetus that is being considered for abortion is known to be anencephalic (lacking a brain), this dramatically changes the issue for most people, though not for all. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A very effective point, as it is hard to see what grounds could be given for not aborting in this case. But the brain then clearly becomes the focus of why abortion is often rejected by many people. |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Might plants just be 'very slow animals', enjoying sentience that has been overlooked by us because of our human timescale chauvinism? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Delightful thought, arising from pondering the significance of the speed of operation of the brain. I think it is false, because I think high speed is essential to mind, and Dennett seems not to. |
8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
Full Idea: If we exclude the idea of God, it is impossible to have an exact idea of virtue. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1808) | |
A reaction: I suspect that an 'exact' idea is impossible even with an idea of God. This is an interesting defence of the importance of God in moral thinking, but it only requires the concept of a supreme being, and not belief. |
8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |
Full Idea: We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rather true at the present time, when a wave of anti-religious books is sweeping through our culture. Presumably this remark used to be true of ancient paganism, but it died away. Christianity, though, is very personal. |