15 ideas
| 15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason. |
| 15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental? |
| 15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
| A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent. |
| 15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had. | |
| From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
| A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one. |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
| A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests. |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad. |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89) | |
| A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday? |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104) | |
| A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical). |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing? | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
| A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here. |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group. |
| 22252 | Capitalism may actually be the best way to foster community [Conway,D] |
| Full Idea: Not only is there no good reason for supposing capitalism inimical to community, but there is reason to think it more conducive to community than the feasible alternatives to it. | |
| From: David Conway (Capitalism and Community [1996], I) | |
| A reaction: Conway is defending an obviously unorthodox view, while attacking the hopes of communitarians. |
| 22253 | Capitalism is just the market, with optional limited government, and perhaps democracy [Conway,D] |
| Full Idea: There are three types of capitalism: 1) the market - private ownership, labor contracts and profit, 2) limited government - the state provides goods the market cannot do, 3) limited government with democracy - with political freedom and elections. | |
| From: David Conway (Capitalism and Community [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I would have thought that capitalism is compatible with a fair degree of workplace democracy, which would make a fourth type. |
| 22256 | Capitalism prefers representative democracy, which avoids community decision-making [Conway,D] |
| Full Idea: By opting for representative rather than direct democracy, capitalism is said to preclude political community, for which the citizens of a state must possess a common will, which needs their direct participation in decisions. | |
| From: David Conway (Capitalism and Community [1996], V) | |
| A reaction: Conway does not accept this claim. I'm beginning to wonder whether the famous British electoral system is actually a capitalist conspiracy against the people. |
| 22255 | Capitalism breaks up extended families, and must then provide welfare for the lonely people [Conway,D] |
| Full Idea: It is said that capitalism encourages the breakup of extended families, which creates the need for extensive state welfare for those indigent members of society who can no longer rely on their own family to take care of them. | |
| From: David Conway (Capitalism and Community [1996], V) | |
| A reaction: Conway does not accept this claim. It seems to simplistic to say that capitalism is the sole culprit. Any rise of mechanisation in agriculture would break up rural extended families. |
| 22257 | Capitalism is anti-community, by only valuing individuals, and breaking up families [Conway,D] |
| Full Idea: Communitarns say capitalism is inimical to family community, because it encourages an individualistic mentality which only values self-fulfilment, and because it demands labour mobility which is disruptive of families. | |
| From: David Conway (Capitalism and Community [1996], VI) | |
| A reaction: Chicken-and-egg with the first one. Small entrepreneurs are individualists who seek their own gain. It is big capitalism that sucks in the others. Traditional community is based on labour-intensive agriculture. |