25 ideas
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: My current use of the Aristotelian term 'definition' is intended to correspond to what is typically accessible to a scientist only at the end of a successful investigation into the nature of a particular phenomenon. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: It is crucial to understand that Aristotle's definitions could be several hundred pages long. It has nothing to do with dictionary definitions. He proposes 'nominal' and 'real' definitions. |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Since essences cause the other necessary features of a thing, so definitions, as the linguistic correlates of essences, explain, together with other axioms, the propositions describing those necessary features. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: This is nice and clear. Definitions are NOT essences - they are the linguistic correlates of essences, and mirror those essences. The necessary features are not the only things needing explanation. That picture is too passive. |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me. |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori… |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish (as Aristotle and Fine do) between what belongs to the essence of an object, and what merely follows from the essence of an object. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: This can help to clarify the confusions that result from treating necessary properties as if they were essential. |
13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular. | |
From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36) | |
A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?). |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Individual instances of a kind of phenomenon, in Aristotle's view, can only be perceived through sense-perception; but they are not the proper subject-matter of scientific demonstration and definition. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: A footnote (11) explains that this is because they involve syllogisms, which require universals. I take Aristotle, and anyone sensible, to rest on individual essences, but inevitably turn to generic essences when language becomes involved. |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: If an object has a certain property essentially, then it follows that the object has the property necessarily (if it exists). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.2) | |
A reaction: She is citing Fine, who says that the converse (necessity implying essence) is false. I agree with that. I also willing to challenge the first bit. I suspect an object can retain identity and lose essence. Coma patient; broken clock; aged athlete. |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1) | |
A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong. |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language? | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented? |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Demonstration encompasses more than deductive entailment, in that the explanatory order of priority represented in a successful demonstration must mirror precisely the causal order of priority present in the phenomena in question. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: She is referring to Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics'. Put so clearly this sounds like an incredibly useful concept in discussing how we present good modern scientific explanations. Reinstating Aristotle is a major priority for philosophy! |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: In a proper demonstrative argument, the middle term must be explanatory of the conclusion, in a very specific sense: the middle term must state what properly belongs to the definition of the kind of phenomenon in question. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: So 'All men are mortal, S is a man, so S is mortal'. The middle term is 'man', which gives a generic explanation for why S is mortal. Explanation as categorisation? I don't think this is the whole story of Aristotelian explanation. |
13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly. | |
From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32) | |
A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain. |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The Greek does not disambiguate between 'cause' and 'explanation', since the same terms ('aitia' and 'aition') can be translated in both ways. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1 n15) | |
A reaction: This is essential information if we are to understand Aristotle's Four Causes, which are quite baffling if we take 'causes' in the modern way. The are the Four Modes of Explanation. |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Both the question 'what is thunder?', and the question 'why does thunder occur?', for Aristotle, are answered simultaneously, once it has been discovered what the essence of thunder it, i.e. what it is to be thunder. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1 n10) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be pretty much the whole story about essences. |
13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses. | |
From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34) | |
A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing. |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli. |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination. |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere. |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral. |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade'). |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability. |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4) | |
A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary). |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4) | |
A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps. |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken. |