25 ideas
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me. |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori… |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1) | |
A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong. |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language? | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented? |
17471 | Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later. |
17472 | Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli. |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination. |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere. |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral. |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade'). |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability. |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4) | |
A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary). |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4) | |
A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps. |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken. |
8991 | Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: It became impossible for Foucault to accept that power is sometimes decent and benign. | |
From: report of Michel Foucault (Power/Knowledge [1980]) by Roger Scruton - Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture p.12 | |
A reaction: Actually Idea 7425 suggests that Foucault has no dream of eliminating power, but he does seem to be utterly in favour of maximum autonomy, and to regard paternalism as inherently evil. What sort of parent would Foucault have been? |
17465 | Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2) | |
A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth. |
17469 | 'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) |
17468 | Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3) |
17470 | Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it. |
17473 | It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless. |
17474 | Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together. |
17475 | For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2) | |
A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular. |
17467 | Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point. |
17466 | Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3) |