Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Of Civil Liberty', 'Practical Necessity' and 'Lewis's Programme'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Any notion of necessity must carry with it a corresponding notion of impossibility, …but it can make a difference which one of them presents itself first and more naturally.
     From: Bernard Williams (Practical Necessity [1982], p.127)
     A reaction: I like this because it connects modality with experience, rather than with formal logic. It seems right that in life we immediately see either a necessity or an impossibility, and inferring the other case is an afterthought.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
     Full Idea: In reaction to two classic difficulties in Goodman's treatment of counterfactuals - the contenability problem and the explication of law - a radically different approach was instigated by Stalnaker (1968) and has been developed by Lewis.
     From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p208)
     A reaction: [I record this for study purposes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume]
     Full Idea: In modern times monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men.
     From: David Hume (Of Civil Liberty [1750], p.54)
     A reaction: Dreams of simple 'government by law' disappeared with the rise of modern media, which can be controlled by wealth.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
     Full Idea: In my view, counterfactual conditionals are analysed in terms of causation.
     From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p.208)
     A reaction: This immediately sounds more plausible to me. Counterfactual claims are rather human, whereas causation (if we accept it) seems a feature of nature. The key question is whether some sort of 'dependency' is a feature of counterfactuals.