9 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |
A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Hilbert wanted to derive ideal mathematics from the secure, paradox-free, finite mathematics (known as 'Hilbert's Programme'). ...Note that for the realist consistency is not something we need to prove; it is a precondition of thought. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900], 6.7) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: I am an intuitive realist, though I am not so sure about that on cautious reflection. Compare the claims that there are reasons or causes for everything. Reality cannot contain contradicitions (can it?). Contradictions would be our fault. |
10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of pure mathematics is this: In the beginning was the sign. | |
From: David Hilbert (works [1900]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Why did people invent those particular signs? Presumably they were meant to designate something, in the world or in our experience. |
10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Hilbert replaced a semantic construal of inconsistency (that the theory entails a statement that is necessarily false) by a syntactic one (that the theory formally derives the statement (0 =1 ∧ 0 not-= 1). | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Finding one particular clash will pinpoint the notion of inconsistency, but it doesn't seem to define what it means, since the concept has very wide application. |
10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Hilbert's project was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using just finitary means, to convince all parties that no contradictions will follow from employing the infinitary notions and reasoning. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This is the project which was badly torpedoed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
Full Idea: In modern times monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men. | |
From: David Hume (Of Civil Liberty [1750], p.54) | |
A reaction: Dreams of simple 'government by law' disappeared with the rise of modern media, which can be controlled by wealth. |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |