13169
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I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.
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13170
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The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
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A reaction:
I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
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17643
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Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
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Full Idea:
Relative to the description 'that statue', a certain shape is an essential property of the object; relative to the description 'that piece of clay', the shape not an essential property (but being clay is).
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From:
Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
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A reaction:
Relative to the description 'that loathsome object', is the statue essentially loathsome? Asserting the essence of an object is a response to the object, not a response to a description of it. This is not the solution to the statue problem.
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17642
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The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
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Full Idea:
Moore and Russell held the strange view that 'sensibilia' (sense data) are mind-independent entities: a view so dotty, on the face of it, that few analytic philosophers like to be reminded that this is how analytic philosophy started.
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From:
Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
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A reaction:
I suspect the view was influenced by the anti-psychologism of Frege, and his idea that all the other concepts are mind-independent, living by their own rules in a 'third realm'. Personally I think analytic philosophy needs more psychology, not less.
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21091
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It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A republican and free form of government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.14)
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A reaction:
Presumably if you attain absolute power you can write any old constitution you like (Clause 1: the presidency is for life). But there does seem much point in doing it - unless it is to facilitate the use of the law for persecutions.
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21092
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Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A nobility may possess power in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which each have a distinct power and authority.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.15)
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A reaction:
He says the first type is found in Venice, and is preferable to the second type, which is found in Poland. Presumably in the shared version there is some restraint on depraved nobles. The danger is each noble being an autocrat.
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13167
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We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.
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