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12737
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Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
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A reaction:
Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.
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14618
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Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
On one view, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; according to the other, a semantics is taken to be a theory of truth for that language.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], Intro)
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A reaction:
The first is Frege, the second Tarski via Davidson, says Fine. Fine argues against these as the correct alternatives, and says the distinction prevents us understanding what is really going on. He votes for semantics as giving 'semantic requirements'.
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14619
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The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The source of the Quinean scepticism about analytic and synthetic is, first, scepticism over whether we can factor truth into a semantic and a factual component, and (second) if we can, is the factual component ever null?
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 1)
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A reaction:
You certainly can't grasp 'bachelors are unmarried men' if you haven't grasped the full Woosterian truth about men and marriage. But I could interdefine four meaningless words, so that you could employ them in analytic sentences.
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21091
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It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A republican and free form of government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.14)
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A reaction:
Presumably if you attain absolute power you can write any old constitution you like (Clause 1: the presidency is for life). But there does seem much point in doing it - unless it is to facilitate the use of the law for persecutions.
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21092
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Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A nobility may possess power in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which each have a distinct power and authority.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.15)
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A reaction:
He says the first type is found in Venice, and is preferable to the second type, which is found in Poland. Presumably in the shared version there is some restraint on depraved nobles. The danger is each noble being an autocrat.
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