37 ideas
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The standard classification holds that 'animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.5) | |
A reaction: My understanding of 'difference' would take it down to the level of the individual, so the question is - which did Aristotle believe in. Not all commentators agree with Oderberg, and Wedin thinks the individual substance is paramount. |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: To define something just means to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish it from all other things of a different kind. To distinguish it from all other things of the same kind belongs to the theory of 'individuation'. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I take Aristotle to have included individuation as part of his understanding of definition. Are tigers a kind, or are fierce tigers a kind, and is my tiger one-of-a-kind? |
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: We negate predicates but do not negate names. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §88) | |
A reaction: This is a point for anyone like Ramsey who wants to collapse the distinction between particulars and universals, or singular terms and their predicates. |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian account of numbers is that their existence depends on the existence of things that are not numbers, ..since numbers are abstractions from the existence of things. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is the deeply unfashionable view to which I am attached. The problem is the status of transfinite, complex etc numbers. They look like fictions to me. |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Being is heterogeneous: there is substantial being, accidental being, complete being, incomplete being, necessary being, contingent being, possible being, absolute being, relative being, intrinsic being, extrinsic being, and so on. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Dependent being? Oderberg is giving the modern scholastic view. Personally I take 'being' to be univocal, even if it can be qualified in all sorts of ways. I don't believe we actually have any grasp at all of different ways to exist. |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories are usually not assumed to be ordered by containment, but also be generality. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: I much prefer generality, which is responsive to the full picture, whereas containment seems to appeal too much to the orderly and formalised mind. Containments overlap, so we can't dream of a perfectly neat system. |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: How far down are we allowed to go before the categories become too special to qualify as ontological categories? | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, because we can't deny a category to a set with only one member, otherwise the last surviving dodo would not have been a dodo. |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: There is an idea that objects belonging to the same category have the same criteria of identity. This view was first explicitly endorsed by Frege (1884), and was later systematized by Dummett (1981). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: This approach is based on identity between equivalence classes. Westerhoff says it means, implausibly, that the resulting categories cannot share properties. |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My fundamental idea is that 'form-sets' are intersubstitutable constituents of states of affairs with the same form, and 'base-sets' are special form-sets which can be used to construct other form-sets. Ontological categories are the base-sets. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The spirit of this is, of course, to try to achieve the kind of rigour that is expected in contemporary professional philosophy, by aiming for some sort of axiom-system that is related to a well established precise discipline like set theory. Maybe. |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It is usually assumed of ontological categories that they can explain why certain substitutions make a statement false ('prime' for 'odd'), while others make it meaningless ('sweet' for 'odd', of numbers). | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §05) | |
A reaction: So there is a strong link between big ontological questions, and Ryle's famous identification of the 'category mistake'. The phenomenon of the category mistake is undeniable, and should make us sympathetic to the idea of categories. |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Systems of ontological categories are systematizations of our intuitions about generality, intersubstitutability, and identity. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §23) | |
A reaction: I think we might be able to concede this without conceding the relativism about categories which Westerhoff espouses. I would claim that our 'intuitions' are pretty accurate about the joints of nature, and hence accurate about these criteria. |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Categories in terms of generality, dependence and containment are unsatisfactory because of the 'cut-off point problem': they don't give an account of how far down the order we can go and be sure we are still dealing with categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: I don't see why this should be a devastating objection to any theory. I have a very clear notion of a human being, but a very hazy notion of how far back towards its conception a human being extends. |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: It seems to be one of the central points of constructing systems of ontological categories that everything can be placed in some category or other. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §49) | |
A reaction: After initial resistance to this, I suppose I have to give in. The phoenix (a unique mythological bird) is called a 'phoenix', though it might just be called 'John' (cf. God). If there were another phoenix, we would know how to categorise it. |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Surveyed ontological systems show overlaps: properties and relations turn up in every system; individuals form part of five systems; abstracta, collections/sets and events are in four; facts are in two. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §02) | |
A reaction: Westerhoff is a hero for doing such a useful survey. Of course, Quine challenges properties, and relations are commonly given a reductive analysis. Individuals can be challenged, and abstracta reduced. Sets are fictions. Events or facts? Etc. |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: I deny the absolutism of a unique system of ontological categories and the essentialist view of membership in ontological categories as necessary features. ...I regard ontological categories as similar to axioms of formalized theories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that modern axioms are not fundamental self-evident truths, but an economic set of basic statements from which some system can be derived. There may be no unique set of axioms for a formal system. |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that categories are relativistic, used for systematization, and that it is not an intrinsic feature of an object to belong to a category, and that there is no fundamental distinction between individuals and properties. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He calls his second conclusion 'anti-essentialist', but I think we can still get an account of (explanatory) essence while agreeing with his relativised view of categories. Wiggins might be his main opponent. |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: What ontological category a thing belongs to is not dependent on its inner nature, but dependent on what other things there are in the world, and this is a contingent matter. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §89) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at those, like Wiggins, who claim that category is essential to a thing, and there is no possible world in which that things could belong to another category. Sounds good, till you try to come up with examples. |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.5) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a conclusive objection to claims for any such thing to be abstract. See, for example, Dummett's claim that the Equator is an abstract object. |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me? |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The demise of 'substance' was wholly due to mistaken notions, mainly from the empiricists, by which it was conceived either as an unknowable featureless substratum, or as dispensable in favour of some or other bundle theory. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a view that the notion of substance is essential to explaining how we understand the world. I am inclined to think that if we accept the notion of essence we can totally dispense with the notion of substance. |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
Full Idea: Real essences are objectively real, they concern being, they are knowable, they are definable, and they are classifiable. | |
From: report of David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This is a lovely summary (spread over two pages) of what essentialism is all about. It might be added that they are about unity and identity. The fact that they are intrinsically classifiable seems to mislead some people into a confused view. |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Nominalism is consistent with belief in individual essences, but real essentialism postulates essences as universals (quiddities). Nominalists are nearly always empiricists, though the converse may not be the case. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is where I part company with Oderberg. I want to argue that the nominalist/individualist view is more in tune with what Aristotle believed (though he spotted a dilemma here). Only individual essences explain individual behaviour. |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Essential kinds can be very specific, and arguably too specific for the purposes of ontological categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: Interesting. There doesn't seem to be any precise guideline as to how specific an essential kind might be. In scientific essentialism, each of the isotopes of tin has a distinct essence, but why should they not be categories |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Real essentialism, more than any other ontological theory, stresses and seeks to explain the unity of objects. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A key piece in the jigsaw I am beginning to assemble. If explanation is the aim, and essence the key to explanation, then explaining unity is the part of it that connects with other metaphysics, about identity and so on. 'Units' breed numbers. |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Essence is not reducible to explanatory relations, ...and fundamentally the role of essence is not explanatory but constitutive. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Effectively, this asserts essence as part of 'pure' metaphysics, but I like impure metaphysics, as the best explanation of the things we can know. Hence we can speculate about constitution only by means of explanation. Constitution is active. |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: A substance is constituted by its essence, and properties are a species of accident. No property of a thing is part of a thing's essence, though properties flow from the essence. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this. How can you know of something which has no properties? I'm wondering if the whole notion of a 'property' should be eliminated from good metaphysics. |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Why not do away with talk of essences and replace it with talk of powers pure and simple, or reduce essences to collections of powers? But then what unites the powers, and could a power be lost, and is there entailment between the powers? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bennett and Hacker 2003 for this view] The point would seem to be that in addition to the powers, there are also identity and unity and kind-membership to be explained. Oderberg says the powers flow from the essence. |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: That is, if two things must have identical properties because they are the same thing, this is because those properties are essential to the thing. Otherwise two things could be the same, even though one of them lacked a non-identifying property. |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The fundamental thesis of real essentialism is that every finite material body has a twofold composition, being a compound of act and potency. ...Reality can take on new kinds of existence because there is a principle of potentiality inherent in reality. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.1) | |
A reaction: I take from this remark that the 'powers' discussed by Molnar and other scientific essentialists is roughly the same as 'potentiality' identified by Aristotle. |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Any realist theory of possible worlds will be circular in its attempt to illuminate modality, for there has to be some criterion of what counts as a possible world. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Seems right. At the very least, if we are going to rule out contradictory worlds as impossible (and is there a more obvious criterion?), we already need to understand 'impossible' in order to state that rule. |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The necessity of identity carries the appearance of triviality, because it is the eviscerated contemporary essentialist form of a foundational real essentialist truth to the effect that every object has its own nature. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this. Writers like Mackie and Forbes have to put the 'trivial' aspects of essence to one side, without ever seeing why there is such a problem. Real substantial essences have necessity of identity as a side-effect. |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The rigid designator approach to essentialism has essentialist assumptions. ..The necessity of identity is built into the very conception of a rigid designator,..and Leibniz's Law is presupposed...and necessity of origin presupposes sufficiency of origin. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed. He cites Salmon 1981:196 for the last point] This sounds right. You feel happy to 'rigidly designate' something precisely because you think there is something definite and stable which can be designated. |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
Full Idea: In modern times monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men. | |
From: David Hume (Of Civil Liberty [1750], p.54) | |
A reaction: Dreams of simple 'government by law' disappeared with the rise of modern media, which can be controlled by wealth. |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour? |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc. |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: It is incorrect to hold that the job of the real essentialist just is the job of the scientist. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably scientific essentialism, while being firmly a branch of metaphysics, is meant to clarify the activities of science, and thereby be of some practical use. You can't beat knowing what it is you are trying to do. |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Oderberg's point is that essence doesn't just occur at the bottom of the hierarchy of kinds, but can exist on a macro-level, and need not be a concealed structure, as we see in the essence of a pile of stones. |